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IN SERVICE: 10-8
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe
IN MEMORIAM
On December 29, 2009 51-year-old 
Constable Ireneusz (Eric) Czapnik was 
ambushed and stabbed to death while sitting 
in his patrol car outside of the Ottawa 
Hospital Civic Campus at 4:30 am. He was 
writing reports when he was targeted and attacked.
The suspect who attacked him was a suspended constable 
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Two paramedics 
and several civilians subdued the 
suspect until responding  officers took 
him into custody.
Constable Czapnik had served with 
the agency for two years. He is 
survived by his wife, daughter, and 
three sons.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ TURNS TEN
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Police Academy’s “In Service: 10-8” newsletter now spans a 
decade. Billing  itself as a “peer read” publication, it started in 2001 as an “off-the-corner-of-the-desk” 
information source that was initially distributed to independent municipal police departments in British 
Columbia. Today, the newsletter is read from coast to coast to coast. There are readers now spanning  all 
ten provinces and the three territories. It is highlighted on many police training  web pages and hundreds 
and hundreds of police and peace officers as well as many others, subscribe to the email distribution list. 
Our commitment continues in providing our readers with relevant and current information.         
“Police tend to enjoy more public confidence than 
courts, the prison system and parole system.” 
“Confidence in  the Justice System in  British  Columbia:  The Problem, Consequences and Potential Remedies”, released January 
2010 by the British Columbia Branch of the Canadian Bar Association, prepared by Professor Neil Boyd, at p. 6.
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Highlights In This Issue
On-Duty Deaths Rise 4
Policing Across Canada: Facts & Figures 8
Malicious Prosecution Turns On Objective Grounds 11
Prosecutorial Charge Standards 16
2010 Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference 25
Police Acted In Good Faith: Reliable Evidence 
Admitted
29
Officer Knew Or Ought To Have Known The Law: 
Handguns Excluded
31
Police Must Prove Arrest Lawful For Exception To 
Warrant Requirement
37
Officer Need Not Question driver About Last 
Drink
39
Unenclosed Space Not A ‘Place’ 42
DRA Technology Breaches Homeowner’s Privacy 
Interest
44
Jurisprudence Jolt 47
Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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OOPS
In the Volume 9 Issue 6 (November/December 2009) 
edition of “In Service:10-8” the R. v. Quinn case 
referenced on page 21 was incorrectly cited. The 
correct citation is 2009 BCCA 267.
at p. 25
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 CONCLUDED BC POLICE 
COMPLAINTS DIP
A recently released report by BC’s Office of the Police 
Complaint Commissioner reveals that the total 
number of police misconduct allegations concluded 
in 2009 dropped to 960 from 989 the previous two 
years. Complaints may be concluded in the following 
manner:
• Withdrawn  - the complainant may withdraw 
their complaint at any time during the process;
• Reviewed & Closed - Service and Policy 
complaints or informal complaints that are non-
lodged are reviewed and closed by the OPCC;
• Informally Resolved - A complaint may be 
informally resolved through the investigator. 
Both parties must sign a consent letter and have 
10 days to change their minds; 
• Mediated - A complaint may be resolved 
through professional mediation. Both parties 
must sign a consent letter and have 10 days to 
change their minds;
• Summarily Dismissed - Following  a preliminary 
review, a complaint may be summarily 
dismissed if:
• there is no likelihood further investigation 
would produce evidence of a disciplinary 
default;
• the incident occurred more than 12 
months prior to filing the complaint; or
• the complaint is frivolous or vexatious;
• Not Substantiated - Following  an investigation 
the Discipline Authority determines there is no 
evidence to support the al legation of 
misconduct;
• Substantiated -  Following  an investigation the 
Discipline Authority determines the allegation is 
supported by the evidence.
Substantiated
10%
Not Substantiated
46%Summarily Dismissed
18%
Mediated
1%
Informally Resolved
7%
Reviewed & Closed
11%
Withdrawn
8%
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT REVIEWED & CONCLUDED 
Year Total Allegations 
Concluded
Withdrawn Reviewed 
& Closed
Informally 
Resolved
Mediated Summarily 
Dismissed
Not 
Substantiated
Substantiated
2009 960 79 101 67 8 170 438 97
2008 989 71 100 43 1 134 523 117
2007 989 167 54 35 1 167 477 88
2009 Concluded Complaints
Corrective or Disciplinary Measures
The Code of Professional Conduct Regulation allows 
the Discipline Authority to impose one or more of 
the following  corrective or disciplinary measures on 
a police officer after finding a disciplinary default:
• verbal reprimand;
• written reprimand;
• direction to undertake professional counseling;
• direction to undertake special training  or 
retraining;
• direction to work under close supervision;
• suspension without pay for up to 5 days;
• transfer or re-assignment;
• reduction in rank;
• dismissal.
Source: www.opcc.bc.ca
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ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE
On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada rose by two last year, equal 
to the 2007 total. In 2009, four peace 
officers lost their lives on the job. This 
is twice the 2008 total when only 
two on-duty peace officers deaths were recorded, as 
reported by the Officer Down Memorial Page. 
Motor vehicles, not guns, continue to pose the 
greatest risk to officers over the last 10 years. Since 
2000, 31 officers have lost their lives in 
circumstances involving  vehicles, including 
automobile and motorcycle accidents (23), vehicular 
assault (3), and being  struck by a vehicle (5). These 
deaths account for 46% of all on-duty deaths, which 
is more than twice the next leading  cause of gunfire 
(15) in the same 10 year period. On average, seven 
officers lost their lives each year during  the last 
decade, while 2002 had the most deaths at 12. 
2009 ROLL OF HONOUR
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Constable James Lundblad
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
End of Watch: May 5, 2009
Cause of Death: Automobile Accident
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Constable Alan Hack
Ontario Provincial Police
End of Watch: July 6, 2009
Cause of Death: Automobile Accident
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Constable Melanie Roy
Service de Police de la Ville de Levis 
End of Watch: September 7, 2009
Cause of Death: Automobile Accident
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Constable Ireneusz (Eric) Czapnik
Ottawa Police
End of Watch: December 28, 2009 
Cause of Death: Stabbed
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2009 Average Tour: 3 years 8 months
2009 Average Age: 36
2009 by Gender: 1 female, 3 male
Last ten years by Gender: 8 female, 60 male.
Male
88%
Female
12%
On-Duty Deaths 2000-2009 by Gender
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2 1 2 7
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 3 1 1 2 1 3 6 2 1 20
Drowned 1 1 2
Duty related illness 1 1
Fall 1 1
Gunfire 3 3 5 1 1 2 15
Heart attack 1 1 2 1 1 6
Motorcycle accident 1 2 3
Natural disaster 1 1
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 3 2 5
Training accident 1 1
Vehicular assault 1 1 1 3
Total 4 2 4 6 11 7 6 12 7 9 68
Female 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 8
Male 3 2 4 5 10 6 6 10 6 8 60
POLICE ASSAULTS
According  to a recently released Statistics Canada 
report, “Measuring Crime in Canada: Introducing 
the Crime Severity Index and Improvements to the 
Uniform Crime Reporting Survey,” there were 6,497 
incidents of assaulting  a police officer in 2007 
involving  8,160 victims. For other assaults in 2007, 
there were 156,247 victims of common assault 
(level 1), 51,258 victims of assault with a weapon/
cause bodily harm (level 2) and 3,434 victims of 
aggravated assault (level 3). 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2009, Measuring Crime in Canada: 
Introducing the Crime Severity Index and Improvements to 
the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Catalogue no. 85-004-
X, April 2009.
In British Columbia, there were 983 assaults against 
the police in 2008, down from 1,130 in 2007. Of 
those 983 assaults, 951 were cleared (97%). Of the 
712 persons charged with assaulting  police 649 
were adults while 63 were youths. Assaults against 
other officers, however, was 119 in 2008, up from 
98  in 2007. The clearance rate for assaults against 
other officer was 87%. Obstructing  police offences 
reached 1,961 in 2008, also down from 2007 which 
totaled 2,041. The 2008 clearance rate for 
obstruction offences was 92%. Of the 1,019 persons 
charged with obstruction, 956 were adults and 63 
were youths.
Source: BC Police Services Division, 2009, British Columbia 
Crime Trends 1999-2008, available at www.pssg.gov.bc.ca. 
[accessed January 9, 2010]
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2009 U.S. Peace Officer On-
Duty Deaths
Cause Total
Accidental 1
Aircraft accident 4
Assault 2
Automobile accident 33
Duty related illness 2
Gunfire 47
Gunfire (accidental) 2
Heart attack 7
Motorcycle accident 4
Struck by vehicle 6
Vehicle pursuit 3
Vehicular assault 9
Total 120
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2000-2009)
Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Total
Deaths 120 138 193 156 164 164 147 159 242 163 1,646
Avg. age 37 39 39 38 38 40 37 39 38 39 n/a
Avg. tour 9 yrs,
10 mos
11 yrs,
3 mos
11 yrs,
3 mos
11 yrs, 
5 mos
11 yrs, 
1 mos
12 yrs,
9 mos
10 yrs,
4 mos
10 yrs,
10 mos
11 yrs,
4 mos
11 yrs,
1 mos
n/a
Female 1 12 8 9 5 9 6 15 12 6 83
Male 119 126 185 147 159 155 141 144 230 157 1,563
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS DOWN
During  2009, the U.S. lost 120 peace 
officers, down 18 from 2008. The top 
cause of death was gunfire (47) 
followed by automobile accidents (33), 
vehicular assault (9) and heart attack 
(7). 
The state of Texas lost the most officers 
at 11 - once again losing  the most 
officers for the fourth consecutive year - followed by California (8), Florida 
(8), North Carolina (7), Pennsylvania (7), U.S. Government (7), and 
Washington State (7). The average age of deceased 
officers was 37 years while the average tour of 
duty was 9 years and 10 months service. Men 
accounted for more than 99% of officer deaths 
while women made up less than 1 %. 
Females
1%
Males
99%
DEADLIEST DAYS
March 21, 2009 (California) Four members of the 
Oakland  Police Department were shot and killed. Two 
motorcycle officers were shot following  a traffic stop  and 
then, about  two hours later, two SWAT team members were 
shot  and killed after the gunman was tracked  to an apartment 
building  just a few blocks from the original shooting  scene. 
Another SWAT team member managed  to shoot and kill the 
suspect,  a parolee who had been convicted of assault with a 
deadly weapon and was also wanted on a no-bail warrant.
November 29, 2009 (Washington) Four members 
of the Lakewood Police Department  were shot and killed in 
an ambush attack as they sat in a coffee shop doing 
paperwork and  planning  their upcoming  shift.  A lone 
gunman walked in and  opened fire on the officers, who were 
in full uniform and wearing  protective safety vests. They were 
all veteran law enforcement officers with between eight  and 
14 years of  experience each. The suspect was a career 
criminal  who had recently been released  from jail and had an 
extensive criminal history in both Washington state and 
Arkansas. He was subsequently killed by police.
Source: www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/deadliest.html
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed January 2, 2010]
“It Is Not How These Officers Died That 
Made Them Heroes. It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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MORE ON CANADA’s AUTO 
THEFT
Statistics Canada reported that there were 125,271 
theft of motor vehicles in 2008. This was down from 
145,071 in 2007, a drop of 15%. 
Several census metropolitan areas saw substantial 
decreases in motor vehicle theft. These areas were 
led by Winnipeg  (-44%), St. John’s (-39%), Moncton 
(-31%), London (-23%), Ottawa (-23%), Vancouver 
(-22%), and Halifax (-20%). Other CMAs however, 
saw an increase. These included Guelph (+20%), 
Kelowna (+18%), and Peterborough (+12%).
Illegal Firearms
“Police and other agencies interviewed note that 
the number of firearms seized by the police has 
dramatically increased in the last ten years. 
Officers who are aware of what occurs at the 
street level consistently state that, while ten years 
ago finding an illegal firearm was a relatively rare 
event for a regular member, now it is a relatively 
common occurrence.” Tony Heemskerk and Eric 
Davis (November 2008) A Report on the Illegal 
Movement of Firearms in British Columbia, at p. 1. 
REsearchportsviews
CANADA’s TOP TEN STOLEN 
VEHICLES
On December 9, 2009 the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada released its annual list of the most 
frequently stolen vehicles in Canada. According  to 
the report there is an increasing  involvement of 
organized crime in auto theft as evidenced by the 
appearance of high-end models on the list. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada www.ibc.ca
TOP 10 STOLEN AUTOS
YR MAKE MODEL
1 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2 2003 Cadillac Escalade ESV 4-door AWD
3 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
4 2006 Chev/GMC Trailbazer SS 4-door 4WD
5 2002 Cadillac Escalade EXT 4-door AWD
6 2005 Cadillac Escalade ESV 4-door AWD
7 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse Spyder 2-door
8 2000 Audi S4 Quattro 4-door
9 2006 Hummer H2 4-door AWD
10 2005 Cadillac Escalade 4-door AWD
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CANADA, 2008
Area Number Rate % change
2007 to 2008
MAN 9,013 746 -39%
NWT 317 732 +6%
AB 21,968 613 -8%
SK 5,534 545 -1%
NU 169 537 -20%
BC 22,829 521 -17%
YK 170 513 +24%
QU 31,091 401 -15%
ON 30,722 238 -12%
NB 1,283 172 -5%
NS 1,577 168 -16%
PEI 165 118 -2%
NL 433 85 -29%
Canada 125,271 376 -15%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2009, Police-reported  Crime Statistics 
in Canada, 2008, Catalogue no. 85-002-X, July 2009.
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6,199
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2,497
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NL
917
PEI
234
NS
1,877
NB
1,364In 2009 the total expenditure on policing was
$11,448,937,000
RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
Training Academy
1,860
CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 383
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,345
Ontario Provincial Police
 5,973
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2009
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Toronto, ON 5,633 5,548 17%
Montreal, QC 4,563 4,597 30%
Peel Reg., ON 1,749 1,869 16%
Calgary,  AB 1,723 1,748 15%
Edmonton,  AB 1,457 1,487 19%
York Reg., ON 1,370 1,402 17%
Winnipeg, MN 1,358 1,328 14%
Ottawa, ON 1,277 1,349 23%
Vancouver, BC 1,442 1,327 22%
Durham Reg., ON 876 863 19%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According  to a 2009 report 
recently released by Statistics 
Canada, there were 67,085 
police officers across Canada last 
year, an increase of 1,802 
(+1.5%) over 2008. This was the 
third largest annual increase in 30 years. Ontario had 
the most police officers (25,558), up +1.4% while the 
Yukon had the least at 122. WIth a population of 
33,739,859, Canada’s average cop per pop ratio was 
199 police officers per 100,000 residents. 
Total population: 33,739,859
Source: Statistics Canada, 2009, Police 
Resources in Canada, Catalogue no: 
85-225-X, December 2009
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CMA Police Officers & Crime Severity Index
CMA Officers-2009 Crime Severity Index-2008
Toronto, ON 9,828 64
Montreal, QC 6,989 91
Vancouver, BC 3,527 119
Calgary, AB 1,814 85
Edmonton, AB 1,753 122
Winnipeg, MN 1,418 124
Ottawa, ON 1,350 69
Hamilton, ON 1,098 77
Quebec, QC 1,018 64
Kitchener, ON 739 69
St. Catherines-Niagara, ON 707 80
London, ON 703 85
Halifax, NS 688 96
Windsor, ON 597 75
Victoria, BC 531 101
Saskatoon, SK 457 138
Gatineau, QC 420 76
Regina, SK 411 163
St. John’s, NL 327 86
Barrie, ON 288 64
Thunder Bay, ON 260 107
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 256 143
Greater Sudbury, ON 255 74
Sherbrooke, QC 240 77
Brantford, ON 228 104
Kingston, ON 223 68
Trois-Rivieres, QC 214 78
Saint John, NB 211 103
Peterborough, ON 195 66
Guelph, ON 191 58
Saguenay, QC 178 59
Kelowna, BC 171 126
Moncton, NB 150 73
GENDER
There were 12,805 female officers in 2009 
accounting  for 19.1% of all officers or roughly 1 in 
5. This is up from 16.5% in 2004, 12.9% in 1999, 
9.1% in 1994 and 5.8% in 1989. 
Q u e b e c h a d t h e h i g h e s t 
percentage of women (22.5%) 
while Nunavut had the least 
(12.0%). The RCMP HQ and 
Training  Academy were 20.9% 
female. 
The number of women in all 
ranks continued to rise. Senior 
officers were 8.3% female, more 
than doubling  over the last ten 
years. Non-commissioned officers 
were 14.4% female, also more 
than double the percentage from 
a decade ago. Constables were 
21.4% female. This is also up 
from last year. 
Overall, the representation of 
women in policing  continues to 
increase. In 2009, the number of 
women increased (+5%) at a 
faster pace than men (+2%). 
Area % 
Female
QC 22.5%
BC 21.1%
NL 18.3%
ON 17.9%
AB 17.6%
SK 17.1%
NB 15.5%
NS 14.9%
MN 14.5%
NWT 14.3%
PEI 13.2%
YK 12.3%
NU 12.0%
OTHER FA$T FACT$
• Police expenditures rose for the twelfth 
consecutive year;
• Costs for policing  translates to $344 per 
Canadian;
• Among  provinces, Ontario ($294) and Quebec 
($273) reported the highest per capita costs for 
municipal and provincial policing. Prince 
Edward Island ($168) and Newfoundland ($199) 
had the lowest.
• Among  territories, Nunavut ($775) had the 
highest cost per capita followed by the 
Northwest Territories ($664) and the Yukon 
($461).
Based on total expenditures on policing in 2008.
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Canada’s Largest Municipal RCMP Detachments 2009
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Surrey, BC 557 594 21%
Burnaby, BC 257 274 28%
Richmond, BC 215 237 23%
Kelowna,  BC 146 153 23%
Coquitlam,  BC 131 142 28%
Langley Township, BC 123 128 27%
Prince George, BC 121 127 22%
Red Deer,  AB 129 123 31%
Kamloops, BC 120 123 22%
Nanaimo, BC 123 123 22%
RCMP
The RCMP  had the largest presence in 
British Columbia with 5,944 officers, 
followed by Alberta (2,659), Ontario 
(1,397) and Saskatchewan (1,172).
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2009
Rank # of positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 8
Assistant Commissioners 26
Chief Superintendents 56
Superintendents 186
Inspectors 433
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 6
Staff Sergeants Major 16
Staff Sergeants 928
Sergeants 2,090
Corporals 3,570
Constables 11,594
Special Constables 74
Civilian Members 3,607
Public Servants 6,102
Total 28,698
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
According  to Statistics Canada, the majority of 
RCMP officers, 6,447 or 36%, provided provincial 
police services. This was closely followed by RCMP 
municipal policing  (4,674 or 26%) and federal 
policing  (4,483 or 25%). Another 2,414 officers 
were involved in RCMP Headquarters and the 
training  academy (1,860) and other services, such as 
National Police Services and Departmental and 
Divisional Administration. 
RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2009 (numbers do not include 1,860 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Municipal 3,066 960 181 186 - - 208 64 9 - - - - 4,674
Provincial 1,749 1,289 695 591 - - 519 719 100 402 99 173 111 6,447
Federal 946 351 238 176 1,351 948 139 174 22 102 16 12 8 4,483
Other 183 59 58 28 46 40 34 40 12 30 7 11 6 554
Total 5,944 2,659 1,172 981 1,397 988 900 997 143 534 122 196 125 16,158
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The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. As of September 1, 
2009 the force’s on-strength 
establishment was 28,698. This 
includes 18,915 police officers, 
74 special constables, 3,607 
civilian members and 6,102 
public servants.
The RCMP is divided into 15 Divisions with 
Headquarters in Ottawa. Each division is managed 
by a commanding  officer and is designated 
alphabetically. 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
TURNS ON OBJECTIVE 
GROUNDS 
Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51
 
A Saskatchewan Crown prosecutor 
with 12 years experience was 
contacted by a police officer about 
an ongo ing  s exua l a s s au l t 
investigation.  The case involved 
disclosures of sexual abuse made by three 
children against their foster parents and members of 
their extended family, as well as allegations of abuse 
against their biological parents and their mother’s 
boyfriend. The police officer asked the prosecutor for 
his opinion as to whether charges should be laid.  
The prosecutor reviewed the allegations and the 
officer’s file and ultimately advised that if the officer 
believed the allegations then charges should be laid. 
The officer subsequently swore an Information 
against the three accuseds. 
 
During  the course of the preliminary inquiry it 
became apparent that one of the children had lied to 
the court about keeping  notes of the alleged 
abuse.  The prosecutor consulted with his superiors 
and was instructed to continue with the prosecution 
if he believed the essential aspects of the children’s 
stories. Following  the preliminary inquiry, the 
biological parents and mother’s boyfriend were 
committed for trial. At trial the judge convicted the 
three accused on several counts of sexual assault but 
the trial judge urged that the children not be made 
to endure another criminal proceeding  against the 
others.
 
Considering  the judge’s comments and the children’s 
credibility becoming  increasingly uncertain, the 
prosecutor negotiated a plea bargain in which a 
member of the foster parents’ extended family pled 
guilty to four charges of sexual assault.  The 70 
counts of sexual assault against the foster parents 
were stayed. The convictions entered at trial against 
the biological parents and mother’s boyfriend were 
upheld by a majority of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, but were overturned by the Supreme Court 
of Canada and a new trial was ordered. Several 
years following  the stay of proceedings, all three 
RCMP DIVISIONS
Region Division Area
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, SK
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
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children recanted their allegations against the foster 
parents who then commenced a civil suit for 
malicious prosecution against a number of 
individuals involved in the proceedings including 
the prosecutor.
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, 
the judge concluded that the prosecutor had 
initiated the proceedings against the plaintiffs, that 
the proceedings had terminated in favour of the 
plaintiffs, that he did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to proceed against the plaintiffs 
and that he had acted maliciously in doing  so.  An 
appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was 
dismissed. The majority was of the view that the 
prosecutors decision to proceed absent reasonable 
and probable grounds - he did not have a subjective 
belief in the probable guilt of the plaintiffs - was 
itself sufficient to make out malice.  
 
Malicious Prosecution
Crown prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity 
from a civil suit for malicious prosecution in private 
law. To succeed in an action for malicious 
prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the 
prosecution was:  
1. initiated by the defendant; 
2. terminated in favour of the plaintiff; 
3. undertaken without reasonable and probable 
cause; and 
4. motivated by malice or a primary purpose 
other than that of carrying the law into effect.
 
The tort of malicious prosecution targets the decision 
to initiate or continue with a criminal prosecution.  
Malicious prosecution will only be made out where 
there is proof that the prosecutor’s conduct was 
fuelled by “an improper purpose or motive, a motive 
that involves an abuse or perversion of the system of 
criminal justice for ends it was not designed to 
serve.” Malice does not include recklessness, gross 
negligence or poor judgment.  It is only where the 
conduct of the prosecutor constitutes “an abuse of 
prosecutorial power”, or the perpetuation of “a fraud 
on the process of criminal justice” that malice can 
be said to exist 
In explaining  the four part test, Justice Charron, 
writing  the judgment for the unanimous Supreme 
Court of Canada, stated:
 
Under the first element of the test for malicious 
prosecution, the plaintiff must prove that the 
prosecution at issue was initiated by the 
defendant.  This element identifies the proper 
target of the suit, as it is only those who were 
“actively instrumental” in setting the law in 
motion that may be held accountable for any 
damage that results. As against a Crown 
prosecutor, the initiation requirement will be 
satisfied where the defendant Crown makes the 
decision to commence or continue the 
prosecution of charges laid by police, or adopts 
proceedings started by another prosecutor. 
 
The second element of the tort demands 
evidence that the prosecution terminated in the 
plaintiff’s favour.  This requirement precludes a 
collateral attack on a conviction properly 
rendered by a criminal court, and thus avoids 
conflict between civil and criminal justice.  The 
favourable termination requirement may be 
satisfied no matter the route by which the 
proceedings conclude in the plaintiff’s favour, 
whether it be an acquittal, a discharge at a 
preliminary hearing, a withdrawal, or a stay.  
However, where the termination does not result 
from an adjudication on the merits, for example, 
in the case of a settlement or plea bargain, a live 
issue may arise whether the termination of the 
proceedings was “in favour” of the plaintiff. ...
 
Of course, criminal proceedings may terminate 
in favour of an accused for a number of reasons 
and an accused’s success in a criminal 
proceeding does not mean the prosecution was 
improperly initiated.  The third element which 
must be proven by a plaintiff — absence of 
reasonable and probable cause to commence or 
continue the prosecution — further delineates 
the scope of potential plaintiffs.   As a matter of 
policy, if reasonable and probable cause existed 
at the time the prosecutor commenced or 
continued the criminal proceeding in question, 
the proceeding must be taken to have been 
properly instituted, regardless of the fact that it 
ultimately terminated in favour of the accused...
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Finally, the initiation of criminal proceedings in 
the absence of reasonable and probable grounds 
does not itself suffice to ground a plaintiff’s case 
for malicious prosecution, regardless of whether 
the defendant is a private or public actor.  
Malicious prosecution, as the label implies, is an 
intentional tort that requires proof that the 
defendant’s conduct in setting the criminal 
process in motion was fuelled by malice.  The 
malice requirement is the key to striking the 
balance that the tort was designed to maintain:  
between society’s interest in the effective 
administration of criminal justice and the need 
to compensate individuals who have been 
wrongly prosecuted for a primary purpose other 
than that of carrying the law into effect.  ... 
[references omitted, paras. 53-57]
 
Reasonable and Probable Cause
 
In order for a claim of malicious prosecution to be 
successful, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the 
absence of reasonable and probable cause for 
initiating  or continuing  a prosecution. In earlier 
jurisprudence (Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170), the 
reasonable and probable cause standard - or 
probable guilt standard - was defined as: 
 
Reasonable and probable cause has been 
defined as “an honest belief in the guilt of the 
accused based upon a full conviction, founded 
on reasonable grounds, of the existence of a 
state of circumstances, which, assuming them to 
be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily 
prudent and cautious man, placed in the 
position of the accuser, to the conclusion that 
the person charged was probably guilty of the 
crime imputed”.  
 
This standard was later elaborated on in Proulx v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 66, [2001] 3 
S.C.R. 9 as:
To say that a prosecutor must be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of an accused 
person's guilt before bringing charges is 
obviously incorrect. That is the ultimate question 
for the trier of fact, and not the prosecutor, to 
decide.  However, in our opinion, the Crown 
must have sufficient evidence to believe that 
guilt could properly be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt before reasonable and 
probable cause exists, and criminal proceedings 
can be initiated. A lower threshold for initiating 
prosecutions would be incompatible with the 
prosecutor’s role as a public officer charged with 
ensuring justice is respected and pursued.   
This “probable guilt” standard, however, is lower 
than the “reasonable prospect of conviction” 
standard found in most Crown policy manuals 
across Canada. In a criminal trial, given the burden 
of proof, belief in “probable” guilt means that the 
prosecutor believes, based on the existing  state of 
circumstances, that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt could be made out in a court of law:
[T]he standard found in most Crown policy 
manuals across the country governing the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to 
commence or continue a criminal proceeding  is 
generally higher than the reasonable and 
probable cause requirement under the third 
element of the test for malicious prosecution.  In 
Crown policy manuals, the initiation or 
continuation of a prosecution is generally not 
recommended unless there exists a reasonable 
prospect of conviction and it is in the public 
interest to pursue the criminal proceeding.  It is 
within the realm of prosecutorial discretion to 
set appropriate standards and, as discussed 
above, the civil action is not a vehicle for 
embarking  upon a judicial review of its exercise 
in particular cases. Accordingly, there is nothing 
discordant about a lower standard grounding 
civil liability. [para. 64] 
Although it is well established that the reasonable 
and probable cause inquiry comprises two 
components; a subjective component (an actual 
belief on the part of the prosecutor) and an objective 
component (the belief must be reasonable in the 
circumstances), the third inquiry of the tort of 
malicious prosecution should turn solely on the 
existence or absence of objective grounds: 
If the court concludes, on the basis of the 
circumstances known to the prosecutor at the 
relevant time, that reasonable and probable 
cause existed to commence or continue a 
criminal prosecution from an objective 
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standpoint, the criminal process was properly 
employed, and the inquiry need go no further.  
In carrying  out the objective assessment, care 
must be taken in retroactively reviewing the facts 
actually known to the prosecutor at the relevant 
time — that is, when the decision to initiate or 
continue the proceeding was made.  The 
reviewing court must be mindful that many 
aspects of a case only come to light during the 
course of a trial: witnesses may not testify in 
accordance with their earlier statements; 
weaknesses in the evidence may be revealed 
during cross-examination; scientific evidence 
may be proved faulty; or defence evidence may 
shed an entirely different light on the 
circumstances as they were known at the time 
process was initiated.
 
If a judge determines that no objective grounds 
for the prosecution existed at the relevant time, 
the court must next inquire into the fourth 
element of the test for malicious prosecution:  
malice. [references omitted, paras. 75-77]
Although the absence of a subjective belief, 
regardless of the actual facts, will not satisfy the third 
element of the tort, the presence or absence of the 
prosecutor’s subjective belief in sufficient cause is 
nonetheless a relevant factor on the fourth element 
of the test, the inquiry into malice.
Malice
 
The malice element of the test for malicious 
prosecution considers a defendant prosecutor’s 
mental state in respect of the prosecution at issue.  
Malice is a question of fact, requiring  evidence that 
the prosecutor was impelled by an “improper 
purpose”:
 
In order to prove malice, a plaintiff must ... bring  
evidence that the defendant Crown was acting 
pursuant to an improper purpose inconsistent 
with the office of the Crown attorney.   As we 
have seen, in deciding  whether to initiate or 
continue a prosecution, the prosecutor must 
assess the legal strength of the case against the 
accused.  The prosecutor should invoke the 
criminal process only where he or she believes, 
based on the existing state of circumstances, that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt could be made 
out in a court of law. It follows that, if the court 
concludes that the prosecutor initiated or 
continued the prosecution based on an honest, 
albeit mistaken, professional belief that 
reasonable and probable cause did in fact exist, 
he or she will have acted for the proper purpose 
of carrying  the law into effect and the action 
must fail.
 
The inverse proposition, however, is not true.  
The absence of a subjective belief in sufficient 
grounds, while a relevant factor, does not equate 
with malice.  It will not always be possible for a 
plaintiff to adduce direct evidence of the 
prosecutor’s lack of belief. As is often the case, a 
state of mind may be inferred from other facts.  
In appropriate circumstances, for example when 
the existence of objective grounds is woefully 
inadequate, the absence of a subjective belief in 
the existence of sufficient grounds may well be 
inferred.  However, even if the plaintiff should 
succeed in proving that the prosecutor did not 
have a subjective belief in the existence of 
reasonable and probable cause, this does not 
suffice to prove malice, as the prosecutor's 
failure to fulfill his or her proper role may be the 
resul t of inexper ience, incompetence, 
negligence, or even gross negligence, none of 
which is actionable. Malice requires a plaintiff to 
prove that the prosecutor wilfully perverted or 
abused the office of the Attorney General or the 
process of criminal justice. The third and fourth 
elements of the tort must not be conflated.
 
[A] demonstrable “improper purpose” is the key 
to maintaining the balance ... between the need 
to ensure that the Attorney General and Crown 
prosecutors will not be hindered in the proper 
execution of their important public duties and 
the need to provide a remedy to individuals who 
have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted.  
By requiring proof of an improper purpose, the 
malice element of the tort of malicious 
prosecution ensures that liability will not be 
imposed in cases where a prosecutor proceeds, 
absent reasonable and probable grounds by 
reason of incompetence, inexperience, poor 
judgment, lack of professionalism, laziness, 
recklessness, honest mistake, negligence, or 
even gross negligence.  ... [references omitted, 
paras. 78-81]
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And further:
The court must consider the relevant evidence 
and decide whether, on a balance of 
probabilities, the prosecutor was in fact 
motivated by an improper purpose.  Consistent 
with the approach courts must take in every 
case, this requires an assessment of the “totality 
of all the circumstances”. The need to consider 
the “totality of all the circumstances” does not 
mean that the court is to embark on a 
second‑guessing  of every decision made by the 
prosecutor during  the course of the criminal 
proceedings.  It simply means that a court shall 
review all evidence related to the prosecutor’s 
state of mind, including any evidence of lack of 
belief in the existence of reasonable and 
probable cause, in deciding whether the 
prosecution was in fact fuelled by an improper 
purpose, as alleged.
 
Evidence of the prosecutor’s lack of subjective 
belief in reasonable and probable cause may 
assist in proving that the prosecution was driven 
by an improper purpose.  However, for the 
reasons explained earlier, malice cannot simply 
be inferred from a finding of absence of belief in 
reasonable and probable cause alone, as the 
latter is equally consistent with prosecutorial 
conduct that is not actionable.  Care must be 
taken not to transpose principles derived in the 
context of private prosecutions, where an 
inference of malice from absence of cause does 
not carry the same difficulties, to cases involving 
Crown defendants.   
As noted above, the tort of malicious 
prosecution was born in the context of 
prosecutions between private parties, and the 
malice component of the tort developed 
accordingly.  In many of the historical cases, the 
parties in a malicious prosecution action had a 
pre-existing relationship, and the surrounding 
circumstances were such that it was possible to 
i n f e r a n i m p r o p e r m o t i v e f r o m t h e 
groundlessness of the prosecution alone. As a 
result, courts in early cases of malicious 
prosecution were prepared to infer malice from 
a finding that the prosecution was initiated 
a b s e n t r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r o b a b l e 
grounds.  Indeed, the circumstances of these 
cases easily gave rise to the question: why else 
would a private person initiate a prosecution 
based entirely on facts not believed to be true, or 
worse still, known to be false?
 
While it may have made sense in the context of 
historical private prosecutions to infer malice 
from absence of reasonable and probable cause 
in certain circumstances, a public prosecution 
presents a very different context.  A finding of 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds on 
the objective standard is entirely equivocal in 
terms of a Crown prosecutor’s purpose, 
particularly given that reasonable prosecutors 
may differ on whether a certain body of 
evidence rises to the requisite threshold.  
Likewise, a conclusion that a prosecutor lacked 
a subjective belief in sufficient cause but 
proceeded anyways is equally consistent with 
non-actionable conduct as with an improper 
purpose. To permit an inference of malice from 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds 
alone would nullify the very purpose of the 
malice requirement in an action for malicious 
prosecution and risk subjecting Crown 
prosecutors to liability when they err within the 
boundaries of their proper role as “ministers of 
justice”.
 
In summary, the malice element of the test for 
malicious prosecution will be made out when a 
court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities, 
tha t the de fendant Crown prosecutor 
commenced or continued the impugned 
prosecution with a purpose inconsistent with his 
or her role as a “minister of justice”. The plaintiff 
must demonstrate on the totality of the evidence 
that the prosecutor deliberately intended to 
subvert or abuse the office of the Attorney 
General or the process of criminal justice such 
that he or she exceeded the boundaries of the 
office of the Attorney General.  While the 
absence of a subjective belief in reasonable and 
probable cause is relevant to the malice inquiry, 
it does not dispense with the requirement of 
proof of an improper purpose. [references 
omitted, paras. 85-89].
In this case, the trial judge found that the prosecutor 
lacked reasonable and probable grounds from an 
objective standpoint, and that the prosecutor did not 
possess a subjective belief in the existence of 
grounds when he decided to proceed against the 
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plaintiffs. Although the trial judge found the 
children’s allegations were incredible and that no 
prosecutor could possibly accept their bizarre 
allegations (absent corroborating  evidence) nor 
believe the children to be credible witnesses, the 
police officer believed the children and several 
judges at both the trial and appellate levels accepted 
and relied upon the same allegations by the children 
in convicting  their biological parents. Relying  on the 
findings of those courts did not constitute improper 
“bootstrapping”. On bootstrapping, Justice Charron 
stated:
I wish to add a general comment about 
“bootstrapping”.  Generally speaking, in an 
a c t i o n f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , 
“bootstrapping” occurs when a prosecutor 
argues that he or she had reasonable and 
probable grounds to commence or continue a 
prosecution on the basis of subsequent judicial 
determinations made at the preliminary inquiry 
or the trial itself.   While a determination of guilt 
at a criminal proceeding is not determinative of 
the reasonable and probable cause question 
under the third prong  of the test for malicious 
prosecution, it is a relevant factor that may be 
properly considered in ascertaining  the existence 
or absence of reasonable cause.   Giving weight 
to antecedent judicial determinations works to 
ensure consistency between the criminal and 
civil justice systems.  ... Absent a fundamental 
flaw in the criminal proceedings relied upon, it 
is perfectly reasonable that antecedent judicial 
determinations may support a finding by a civil 
court that there existed reasonable and probable 
cause for an impugned criminal prosecution. 
[para. 97]
 
And neither the plaintiffs nor the courts below had 
pointed to any such improper purpose that impelled 
the prosecutor to prosecute the plaintiffs beyond a 
holding  that he did not have a subjective belief in 
reasonable and probable cause.
 
The prosecutor’s appeal was allowed and the 
plaintiff’s action was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
PROSECUTORIAL CHARGE 
STANDARDS
There are many legal standards or degrees of 
certainty within the law. These include reasonable 
suspic ion, reasonable be l ie f , ba lance o f 
probabilities, clear and convincing  evidence, and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But within many 
prosecutorial manuals, there are charge approval 
standards which take on a different language. 
In some jurisdictions the police decide whether 
charges are preferable (eg. Ontario). In these cases, 
prosecutors will determine whether to continue the 
prosecution or to terminate it. In other provinces 
there is a Crown approval process (eg. British 
Columbia). In those cases, the Crown will decide 
whether to commence a prosecution in the first 
instance. The Crown take their duty in deciding  to 
prosecute very seriously as evidenced by these 
preambles found in select prosecutorial manuals:
........
“Deciding whether to prosecute is among the 
most important steps in the prosecution process. 
Considerable care must be taken in each case to 
ensure that the right decision is made. A wrong 
decision to prosecute and, conversely, a wrong 
decision not to prosecute, both tend to 
undermine the confidence of the community in 
the criminal justice system.” - Federal
........
“If a Crown attorney does not believe the 
evidence supports a conviction, he or she will 
not prosecute.  The Crown attorney is not the 
victim’s lawyer nor is he or she the lawyer for the 
police or complainants. Rather, a Crown 
attorney’s duty is to ensure that justice is served 
by presenting  all available legal proof of the facts 
to the court.” - Manitoba
........
“The decision to prosecute or to discontinue a 
prosecution is among  the most significant of the 
decisions that will be made by a Crown 
prosecutor. Prosecutions which are not well 
founded in law or fact, or which do not serve the 
public interest, may needlessly expose citizens 
to the anxiety, expense and embarrassment of a 
trial. On the other hand, the failure to effectively 
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prosecute a meritorious case can directly impact 
public safety. Both situations tend to undermine 
the confidence of the community in the criminal 
justice system. As such, considerable care must 
be taken in each case to ensure that the best 
possible decision is made.” - Alberta
........
“The decision to continue or terminate a 
prosecution can be one of the most difficult for 
Crown counsel to make. The community relies 
upon Crown counsel to vigorously pursue 
provable charges while protecting individuals 
from the serious repercussions of a criminal 
charge where there is no reasonable prospect of 
conviction.” - Ontario
........
“The decision to initiate or continue a 
prosecution is one of the most important duties 
of Crown Counsel.” - British Columbia 
........
“The decision to prosecute or to discontinue a 
prosecution is the most important decision that a 
prosecutor makes in the criminal justice process. 
Such decisions must reflect sound knowledge of 
the law and careful consideration of the interests 
of victims, the accused and the public at large. 
Prosecutions which are not well founded in law 
or fact, or which do not serve the public interest, 
may unfairly expose citizens to the anxiety, 
expense and embarrassment of a trial. The failure 
to effectively prosecute guilty parties can directly 
impact public safety. Wrong  decisions tend to 
undermine the confidence of the community in 
the criminal justice system.” - Nova Scotia
........
There are two general considerations when deciding 
to prosecute. First, there is an evidential threshold. Is 
there sufficient evidence to begin or continue with 
criminal proceedings?  Second, if the evidence is 
sufficient, then the prosecutor will decide whether 
or not the public interest is best served by the 
prosecution. Just because a criminal investigation 
meets the evidentiary test does not mean it must be 
automatically prosecuted.
EVIDENTIAL THRESHOLD
Depending  on the jurisdiction, the evidential 
standard varies.
Federal - reasonable prospect of conviction
The Public Prosecutions of Canada 
requires a “reasonable prospect of 
conviction”:
In the assessment of the evidence, a bare prima 
facie case is not enough; the evidence must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable prospect 
of conviction. This decision requires an 
evaluation of how strong  the case is likely to be 
when presented at trial. This evaluation should 
be made on the assumption that the trier of fact 
will act impartially and according  to law. 
(15.3.1)
 
The Federal Deskbook outlines a number of criteria 
to consider when determining  whether there is 
sufficient evidence for a proceeding:
• the availability, competence and credibility of 
witnesses and their likely impression on the trier 
of fact;
• the admissibility of evidence implicating  the 
accused;
• any defences that are plainly open to or have 
been indicated by the accused; and
• any other factors which could affect the prospect 
of a conviction such as the existence of a Charter 
violation that will undoubtedly lead to the 
exclusion of evidence essential to sustain a 
conviction.
Federal prosecutors are also advised that:
this evidential standard must be applied 
throughout the proceedings – from the time the 
investigative report is first received until the time 
of trial. When charges are laid, the test may have 
to be applied primarily against the investigative 
report, although it is certainly preferable – 
especially in borderline cases - to look beyond 
the statements of the witnesses. Later in the 
proceedings, especially after a preliminary 
inquiry, counsel may be able to make a more 
effective assessment of some of the issues, such 
as the credibility of witnesses. Assessments of 
the strength of the case may be difficult to make, 
and of course there can never be an assurance 
that a prosecution will succeed. Nonetheless, 
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counsel are expected to review the decision to 
prosecute in light of emerging developments 
affecting  the quality of the evidence and the 
public interest, and to be satisfied at each stage, 
on the basis of the available material, that there 
continues to be a reasonable prospect of 
conviction. If counsel are not so satisfied, they 
may direct that a stay of proceedings be 
entered.”
BC - substantial likelihood of conviction
In British Columbia, the charge 
approval standard is a “substantial 
likelihood of conviction.” The BC 
Crown Policy Manual defines this as:
A substantial likelihood of conviction exists 
where Crown Counsel is satisfied there is a 
strong, solid case of substance to present to the 
Court. In determining whether this standard is 
satisfied, Crown Counsel must determine: 
1. what material evidence is likely to be 
admissible; 
2. the weight likely to be given to the admissible 
evidence; and 
3. the likelihood that viable, not speculative, 
defences will succeed.
In exceptional cases (eg. high risk violent or 
dangerous offenders or where public safety concerns 
are paramount) a BC prosecution may proceed even 
where there is not a substantial likelihood of 
conviction. Instead, the evidentiary test is reduced to 
one of a “reasonable prospect of conviction.” This 
test is described as higher than a prima facie case 
and requires the approval of the Regional or Deputy 
Regional Crown Counsel. As well, the evidentiary 
considerations are modified. 
A weighing of admissible evidence and viable 
defences is not required.  Crown Counsel should 
consider: 
1. what material evidence is arguably 
admissible; 
2. whether that evidence is reasonably capable 
of belief; and 
3. whether that evidence is overborne by any 
incontrovertible defence.
Ontario - reasonable prospect of conviction
Ontario, like the Public Prosecutions 
Service of Canada, requires a 
reasonable prospect of conviction as 
the evidentiary threshold. In the Ontario Crown 
Policy Manual, a reasonable prospect of conviction 
is described as:
The threshold test of “reasonable prospect of 
conviction” is objective.  This standard is higher 
than a "prima facie" case that merely requires 
that there is evidence whereby a reasonable jury, 
properly instructed, could convict. On the other 
hand, the standard does not require "a 
probability of conviction," that is, a conclusion 
that a conviction is more likely than not.
If the Ontario prosecutor “determines there is no 
reasonable prospect of conviction, at any stage of 
the proceeding, then the prosecution of that charge 
must be discontinued.”  
Alberta - reasonable likelihood of conviction
In Alberta the reasonable likelihood 
of convict ion test “permits a 
prosecution to be commenced or 
continued only if the Crown prosecutor has 
sufficient evidence to believe that a reasonable jury, 
properly instructed, is more likely than not to 
convict the accused of the charge(s) alleged.” The 
Alberta Crown Manual described the charge 
standard as follows:
To be clear, this standard contains both a 
subjective and objective element. The Crown 
prosecutor must believe that a conviction is 
likely and that belief must be reasonable in the 
circumstances. In circumstances in which there 
are multiple accused or multiple counts, Crown 
prosecutors must apply the evidential threshold 
to each accused and each charge. A prosecution 
should only proceed against those accused and 
on those charges that meet the threshold test. 
Crown prosecutors must not simply adopt the 
views and enthusiasm of others, such as the 
complainant or investigator. Prosecutors must 
critically assess the Crown’s evidence and must 
take into consideration reliable defence 
ev idence. Whi le no s ing le answer i s 
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determinative, the most important of the 
questions that must be asked as regards the 
evidence are the following.
• Are there inherent (e.g., as with in-custody 
informants) or other concerns respecting  the 
accuracy, credibility or reliability of any of the 
Crown’s witness?
• Do any of these witnesses have improper 
motives that may affect his or her credibility?
• Is there evidence that may support or detract 
from the credibility of any of these witnesses?
• If the identity of the offender is in issue, of 
what strength is the evidence identifying the 
accused as the offender?
• Are there grounds for believing  that some 
inculpatory evidence will likely be excluded?
• If the case depends in part on an admission by 
the accused, is there evidence that might 
support or detract from the reliability of this 
statement?
• Has the accused attempted to explain his 
(alleged) conduct or present a defence? If so, is 
it clear that the explanation or defence (by 
itself or in the context of other evidence or 
information) will be sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt?
Nova Scotia - realistic prospect of conviction
In Nova Scotia a prosecution will go 
forward only where the prosecutor is 
satisfied that the evidence provides a 
“realistic prospect of conviction”:
The decision in regard the existence of a realistic 
prospect of conviction requires an evaluation of 
how strong  the case is likely to be when 
presented in court. The prosecutor is required to 
find that a conviction is more than technically or 
theoretically available – the prospect of 
displacing the presumption of  innocence must 
be real. ... The extent to which the evidence 
must exceed what is necessary for a prima facie 
case cannot be expressed in mathematical terms 
and the concept cannot be applied with 
scientific precision. There are, however, some 
indicators as to where the evidentiary threshold 
lies. First, it must be noted that even when a 
prima facie case exists, a conviction will be set 
aside by an appellate court ... if there is not 
sufficient, reliable evidence with probative value 
to satisfy the court that any conviction based on 
the evidence was reasonable. This may require 
something well beyond a prima  facie case, and 
all cases which are prosecuted are expected pass 
this hurdle. ... It is recognized that even the most 
experienced prosecutors may have great 
difficulty in assessing the strength of a case, 
particularly when only a summary of the 
evidence is available. Nevertheless, prosecutors 
are often able to conclude that an acquittal is 
clearly more likely than a conviction. This leads 
to the second indicator of where the appropriate 
threshold lies: if, having regard to the amount 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Policy v. Malicious Prosecution 
Standard
“[T]he standard found in most 
Crown policy manuals across the 
country governing the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to 
commence or continue a criminal proceeding is 
generally higher than the reasonable and 
probable cause requirement under the third 
element of the test for malicious prosecution. In 
Crown policy manuals, the initiation or 
continuation of a prosecution is generally not 
recommended unless there exists a reasonable 
prospect of conviction and it is in the public 
interest to pursue the criminal proceeding.  It is 
within the realm of prosecutorial discretion to 
set appropriate standards and ... the civil action is 
not a vehicle for embarking upon a judicial review 
of its exercise in particular cases.  Accordingly, 
there is nothing discordant about a lower 
standard grounding civil liability.” - Supreme 
Court of Canada in Miazga v. Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 
51 at para. 64.
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and nature of the evidence, the prosecutor 
concludes that an acquittal is clearly more likely 
than a conviction, the case should not be 
prosecuted. The cases in which there is a 
realistic prospect of conviction  will, of course, 
include those cases in which the prosecutor 
determines that a conviction is more likely than 
not to occur. 
In assessing  the strength of a case and determining 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence upon 
which to found a prosecution, the Nova Scotia 
prosecutor must lean towards the admissibility of 
evidence when the matter is not clear. As well, 
prosecutors must give a limited consideration to 
defences which are plainly open to the accused, or 
which have come to the attention of the prosecutor. 
But it is not necessary for the prosecutor to 
anticipate and consider every possible defence or to 
accept at face value all information provided by the 
accused. A proper assessment of the strength of the 
case may involve the following questions: 
• Are there grounds for believing  that some 
evidence may be excluded? 
• If the case depends in part on admissions by the 
accused, are there any grounds for believing  that 
they are of doubtful reliability having  regard to 
the age, intelligence and apparent understanding 
of the accused? 
• Does it appear that a witness is exaggerating, or 
that his or her memory is faulty, or that the 
witness is either hostile or friendly to the 
accused, or may be otherwise unreliable? 
• Has a witness a motive for telling  less than the 
whole truth? 
• Are there matters which might properly be put to 
a witness by the defence to attack his or her 
credibility? 
• Based on objective indicators, what sort of 
impression is the witness likely to make? 
• How is the witness likely to stand up to cross-
examination? 
• If there is conflict between eye witnesses, does it 
go beyond what one would expect and hence 
materially weaken the case? 
• If there is a lack of conflict between eye 
witnesses, is there anything  which causes 
suspicion that a false story may have been 
concocted? 
• Are all the necessary witnesses competent to give 
evidence? 
• Where child witnesses are involved, are they 
likely to be able to give sworn evidence or to give 
evidence based upon a promise to tell the truth? 
• If identity is likely to be an issue, how cogent and 
reliable is the evidence of those who purport to 
identify the accused? 
• Where two or more accused are charged 
together, is there a reasonable prospect of the 
proceedings being  severed? If so, is there 
sufficient evidence against each accused should 
separate trials be ordered?
PUBLIC INTEREST
Once the evidential standard has been met, the 
Crown then must consider whether the public 
interest requires a prosecution. The factors to 
consider will generally vary from case to case. 
Federal
T h e F e d e r a l D e s k b o o k 
acknowledges that “the more 
serious the offence, the more likely 
the public interest will require that a prosecution be 
pursued.” But the application of and weight to be 
given to the relevant factors will depend on the 
circumstances of each case. Public interest factors 
include:
• the seriousness or triviality of the alleged offence;
• s i g n i f i c a n t m i t i g a t i n g  o r a g g rava t i n g 
circumstances;
• the age, intelligence, physical or mental health or 
infirmity of the accused;
• the accused's background;
• the degree of staleness of the alleged offence;
• the accused's alleged degree of responsibility for 
the offence;
• the prosecution's likely effect on public order and 
morale or on public confidence in the 
administration of justice;
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• whether prosecuting  would be perceived as 
counter-productive, for example, by bringing  the 
administration of justice into disrepute;
• the availabil i ty and appropriateness of 
alternatives to prosecution;
• the prevalence of the alleged offence in the 
community and the need for general and specific 
deterrence;
• whether the consequences of a prosecution or 
conviction would be disproportionately harsh or 
oppressive;
• whether the alleged offence is of considerable 
public concern;
• the entitlement of any person or body to criminal 
compensation, reparation or forfeiture if 
prosecution occurs;
• the attitude of the victim of the alleged offence to 
a prosecution;
• the likely length and expense of a trial, and the 
resources available to conduct the proceedings;
• whether the accused agrees to co-operate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others, or the 
extent to which the accused has already done so;
• the likely sentence in the event of a conviction; 
and
• whether prosecuting  would require or cause the 
disclosure of information that would be injurious 
to international relations, national defence, 
national security or that should not be disclosed 
in the public interest.
Irrelevant criteria to public interest include:
• the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, sexual orientation, political 
associations, activities or beliefs of the accused or 
any other person involved in the investigation;
• Crown counsel's personal feelings about the 
accused or the victim;
• possible political advantage or disadvantage to 
the government or any political group or party; or
• the possible effect of the decision on the personal 
or professional circumstances of those 
responsible for the prosecution decision.
British Columbia
In BC, the Crown Policy Manual 
recognizes that hard and fast rules 
cannot be imposed because the public 
in te res t i s de te rmined by the par t icu la r 
circumstances of each case and the legitimate 
concerns of the local community. Factors which BC 
Crown Counsel are expected to consider include: 
 
Factors Favouring a Prosecution 
 
• the allegations are serious in nature; 
• a conviction is likely to result in a significant 
sentence; 
• considerable harm was caused to a victim; 
• the use, or threatened use, of a weapon; 
• the victim was a vulnerable person, including 
children, elders, spouses and common law 
partners; 
• the alleged offender has relevant previous 
convictions or alternative measures; 
• the alleged offender was in a position of authority 
or trust; 
• the alleged offender’s degree of culpability is 
significant in relation to other parties; 
• there is evidence of premeditation; 
• the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or 
hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or 
physical disability, sexual  orientation, or any 
other similar factor; 
• there is a significant difference between the 
actual or mental ages of the alleged offender and 
the victim; 
• the alleged offender committed the offence while 
under an order of the Court; 
• there are grounds for believing  that the offence is 
likely to be continued or repeated; 
• the offence, although not serious in itself, is 
widespread in the area where it was committed; 
• the need to protect the integrity and security of 
the justice system and its personnel; 
• the offence is a terrorism offence; 
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• the offence was committed for the benefit of, at 
the direction of or in association with a  criminal 
organization. 
 
Factors Against a Prosecution 
 
• a conviction is likely to result in a very small or 
insignificant penalty; 
• there is a likelihood of achieving  the desired 
result without a prosecution by the Criminal 
Justice Branch. This could require an assessment 
of the availability and efficacy of any alternatives 
to such a prosecution, including  alternative 
measures, non-criminal processes or a 
prosecution by the Federal Prosecution Service. 
Crown Counsel need not conclude, in advance, 
that a prosecution must proceed in the public 
interest if a referral for an alternative measure is 
not acceptable. Information with respect to the 
suitability of a candidate for diversion or 
alternative measure is a factor to be taken into 
consideration by Crown Counsel in reaching  a 
final charge assessment decision; 
• the offence was committed as a result of a 
genuine mistake or misunderstanding  (factors 
which must be balanced against the seriousness 
of the offence); 
• the loss or harm can be described as minor and 
was the result of a single incident, particularly if 
caused by misjudgment; 
• the offence is of a trivial or technical nature or 
the law is obsolete or obscure. 
 
Additional Factors to Consider 
 
• the youth, age, intelligence, physical health, 
mental health, and other personal circumstances 
of a witness or victim; 
• the personal circumstances of the accused, 
including his or her criminal record; 
• the length and expense of a prosecution when 
considered in relation to the social benefit to be 
gained by it; 
• the time which has elapsed since the offence was 
committed; 
• the need to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice. 
 
Ontario
Personal, professional or “political” 
consequences of a screening 
decision should never affect an 
Ontario Crown Counsel’s decision, nor should 
stereotypes about certain categories of witnesses 
such as child witnesses, witnesses with mental 
disabilities, and complainants of spouse/partner 
abuse or sexual offences, affect Crown Counsel’s 
judgment.  
 
Alberta
In Alberta, Crown prosecutors are 
advised to “carefully balance the 
factors that favour a prosecution 
against the factors against such proceedings,” while 
noting  that “it would be impossible to articulate and 
catalogue all of the possible public interest factors 
that might inform every decision to prosecute.”
Factors Favouring a Prosecution
• the conduct was serious, because, for example:
• weapons were used
• violence was used or threatened
• the conduct was planned, premeditated and/
or motivated
• there was significant harm, loss or injury 
caused to the complainant and/or the 
community
• the victim was vulnerable (e.g., a child, a 
senior, a spouse, a person who was dependent 
upon the accused, a person who serves the 
public)
• the offence involved an abuse of a position of 
authority or trust
• the offence was directed at the administration 
of justice;
• the accused’s degree of culpability and 
responsibility was significant (especially if in 
relation to any other parties who were involved 
in the conduct);
• the offence was motivated by discrimination 
against the complainant’s ethnic or national 
origin, sex, religious beliefs, political views or 
sexual orientation;
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• owing  to a previous related record or other 
antecedents, it is likely that, absent a prosecution, 
the accused will continue or repeat the conduct 
(i.e., there is a need for individual deterrence); 
and/or
• there exists a need to denounce the conduct and 
deter others.
Factors Militating Against a Prosecution
• the offence is of a trivial or technical nature;
• a conviction is likely to result in a very small or 
insignificant penalty;
• the consequences of a prosecution or conviction 
would be unduly harsh or oppressive for the 
accused;
• the accused has remedied the loss or harm 
(although accused persons must not avoid 
prosecut ion solely because they make 
restitution);
• the accused has demonstrated genuine remorse 
and has steps taken towards rehabilitation (the 
significance of which must be assessed in the 
context of the seriousness of the offence);
• the desired result could be achieved through an 
alternative to prosecution;
• the law that is alleged to have been breached is 
obsolete or obscure; and/or
• a prosecution could publicize information that 
that could harm confidential informants, ongoing 
investigation, international relations or national 
security, or other important local and national 
interests.
Additional Factors
• the circumstances of the accused, including  his 
or her age, maturity, mental health, criminal 
antecedents (including  other outstanding  charges 
or extant court orders) and background;
• the likely effect of a prosecution on public 
morale and the public’s confidence in the justice 
system;
• the length and expense of the trial when 
considered in relation to the seriousness or 
triviality of the offence, the likely sentence that 
would result from a conviction, and the attendant 
public benefit(s);
• the degree of past or anticipated cooperation of 
the accused in the investigation, apprehension or 
prosecution of others (see also, the guidelines 
and pract ice memoranda pertaining  to 
Informants);
• the willingness and ability of witnesses, including 
– where necessary – the complainant, to testify in 
the proceedings;
• the time which has elapsed since the offence was 
committed;
• the availability of compensation, restitution, or 
reparation to any person or body upon a 
successful prosecution, including  any entitlement 
criminal compensation, reparation or forfeiture if 
a prosecution action is taken; and/or
• whether, due to the passage of time, the alleged 
offence is triable only on indictment.
Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia also recognizes that not 
every case where there is  sufficient 
evidence to provide a realistic 
prospect of conviction requires a prosecution. The 
following example is used:
There would be a public outcry, if, for instance, 
prosecution resources were expended in 
prosecuting a theft case in which it was alleged, 
based on circumstantial evidence, that the 
accused had entered an orchard two years ago 
and picked an apple without the owner’s 
permission. On the other hand, if the accused 
had been caught red-handed, yesterday, by 
apple growers concerned with widespread 
damage to orchards by intruders, prosecution 
might be appropriate. 
Instead, a consistent, principled basis is required for 
determining  the public interest. Although public 
interest factors will vary from case to case, factors to 
consider include the following:
 
• the gravity, or, conversely, the triviality of the 
alleged incident or that it is of a ‘technical’ nature 
only (generally, the more grave the incident, the 
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more likely that the public interest will require 
prosecution); 
• the age, intelligence, physical health, mental 
health or special infirmity of the alleged offender, 
a witness or victim; 
• the staleness of the alleged offence; 
• the degree of culpability of the alleged offender 
in connection with the offence (particularly in 
relation to any other alleged parties to the 
offence); 
• the obsolescence or obscurity of the law; 
• whether the prosecution would be perceived as 
counter-productive, for example, by bringing  the 
law into disrepute; 
• the availability and efficacy of any alternatives to 
prosecution;                               
• the prevalence of the alleged offence and the 
need for general deterrence; 
• whether the consequences of any resulting 
conviction would be unduly harsh and 
oppressive; 
• any entitlement of people or agencies to 
compensation, reparation or forfeiture if 
prosecution action is taken; 
• the attitude of the victim of the alleged offence to 
a prosecution; 
• the likely length and expense of a trial; 
• whether the alleged offender is willing  to co-
operate in the investigation or prosecution of 
others, or the extent to which the alleged 
offender has done so; 
• the likely outcome in the event of a finding  of 
guilt having  regard to the sentencing  options 
available to the court; 
• the necessity to maintain public confidence in 
Parliament, the Legislature and the administration 
of justice.
As well, in general, “the more grave the incident, the 
more likely that the public interest will require 
prosecution.” Where one or more of the following 
elements are present, the gravity of the offence will 
be increased:  
• the perpetrators used a weapon, violence or 
threats of violence; 
• the victim was a judicial official, peace officer, or 
someone preserving public safety; 
• the criminal activity was directed at the 
administration of justice; 
• the incident involved premeditation or planning; 
• the offence was carried out by a gang  or group 
organized for that purpose; 
• the matter involved the corruption of an official; 
• the alleged offender was subject to court 
supervision at the time of the incident; 
• the incident was part of a pattern of criminal 
behaviour, or behaviour likely to be repeated by 
the offender. 
Factors to not Consider
The following  factors are to be excluded from 
consideration in determining  whether the public 
interest is best served by a prosecution: 
• the alleged offender’s race, religion, sex, national 
origin, or political associations; 
• personal feelings concerning  the victim or the 
alleged offender; 
• any partisan political advantage or disadvantage 
which might flow from the decision to undertake 
or stop a prosecution; or
• the possible effect on the personal or professional 
circumstances of those responsible for the 
charging decision. 
References:
Federal - The Federal Prosecution Service DESKBOOK (date 
modified 2008-12-24)
www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/fps-sfp/fpd/toc.html 
Manitoba - Manitoba Prosecution Service
www.gov.mb.ca/justice/prosecutions/mbprosecutionservice.html
BC - Crown Counsel Policy Manual (effective date October 2, 2009)
www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/index.htm
Ontario - Crown Policy Manual (March 21, 2005)
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/default.asp
Nova Scotia - Crown Attorney Manual: Prosecution and 
Administrative Policies for the PPS (edited February 29, 008)
www.gov.ns.ca/pps/ca_manual.htm
Alberta - Crown Prosecutors’ Policy Manual (May 20, 2008)
http://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/criminal_pros/Publications
%20Library%20%20Criminal%20Prosecutions/Crown Prosecutors' 
PolicyManual.aspx/DispForm.aspx?ID=3
•
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The Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference will be held at the Ramada Plaza and 
Conference Centre in Abbotsford, British Columbia from April 27-30, 2010. The 2010 
Conference Topic is “Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System.” Speakers 
will include Supt. Dan Malo, Andrée Cazabon, Dr. Irwin Cohen, Dr. Matt Logan, Crystal Meth 
Society, Glen Flett, Dr. Lohrasbe, Sgt. Chris Thompson, Rosalind Currie, Diane Sowden, Dr. 
Ray Corrado, Dr. Mary Ellen O'Toole, Det. Judy Dizy, Det. Chris Eeg, Gil Johnston, and Victor 
Porter. For more information visit:
www.fvcjc.ca
Spousal Violence
“Spousal violence is a power-based crime. It is a crime based on the abuse of power, usually by the 
male partner in the relationship, directed at the female partner. Therefore, it is also a gender-based 
crime. The use of fear – through the use of physical and emotional violence and both explicit and 
implicit threats – is always part of the dynamics of spousal violence against women.
Investigation and assessment of what is going on in any case of spousal violence must take account of 
these dynamics. Investigation and assessment in these cases cannot be undertaken outside of this 
context. For example, while women may use violence in their relationships ... , this violence must be 
seen within the context of which partner has the most power in the relationship; who has the most 
potential for harming the other; what has been the ongoing dynamic of violence, fear, and coercion in 
the relationship; who has been most seriously injured; and who is the primary rather than the first 
aggressor.” - Linda Light ( July 2009) Police-reported Spousal Violence Incidents in B.C. in which Both 
Partners are Suspects/Accused: An Exploratory Study at pp. 4-5. www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/victim_services/publications/policy/
PoliceReportedSpousalIncidentsDualSuspects.pdf
REsearchportsviews
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Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference 2010 
Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System 
Aprii ll   27-  30,,   2010  
www.fvcjc.ca 
Programme 
 
 
 
TUESDAY, April 27, 2010 
5:00 pm- 7:00pm          Registration 
7:00 pm – 9:00 pm  Evening Welcome Reception  
 
 
WEDNESDAY, April 28, 2010 
8:00 am – 8:30 pm          Registration and Continental Breakfast 
8:30 am – 9:00 pm Opening Ceremonies/ Welcoming Remarks  
Deputy Chief Rick Lucy 
9:00 am – 12:00 am 
 
Understanding Gangs 
Keynote Address: Gil Johnston (SIO) and Supt. Dan Malo 
12:00pm - 1:00 pm  Lunch 
1:00pm –  2 :00 pm 
Gangs in Prison 
Gil Johnston 
Criminal Investigations and 
Computer Forensics 
Det. Chris Eeg 
Risk Profiles for Serious and 
Violent Youth Offending  
Dr. Ray Corrado and  
Dr. Irwin Cohen 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm 
Active Shooters 
Sgt. Chris Thompson 
Crystal Meth- A 
Community Response 
METH BC  
Youth Violent Offender 
Programming in British 
Columbia: An Overview 
Dr. Heather Gretton and 
Dr. Grant Burt 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm  Meet the Speakers and Questions  
 
6:00 pm – 9:00 pm  COMMUNITY FORUM (Matsqui Auditorium) 
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The Early Bird registration fee is $329 for payments received prior to January 15th, 2010. 
Thereafter, a regular registration fee of $399 will apply. The Ramada Inn Hotel is providing 
accommodations for approximately $120/night on a first come, first serve basis.
The full three-day conference will entail keynote addresses and break-out sessions that are 
carefully orchestrated to best suit a varied audience. One of the key goals of the conference is to 
bring together professionals in the field that can speak from their experiences and established 
expertise to assist in early intervention, prevention, and risk management. The participants will 
have an opportunity to network and build partnerships to meet individual organizational goals, 
as well as the common objective of reducing crime in our communities.
Fraser Valley Criminal Justice Conference 2010
Youth, Communities and the Criminal Justice System
April 27-30, 2010
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THURSDAY, April 29, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm Engaging with Youth  
Andrée Cazabon – Filmmaker and former street youth 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
TCO 2 Presentation 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm 
It Can Happen to Anyone 
Diane Sowden 
BC’s Office to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons 
Victor Porter and 
Rosalind Currie 
Youth, Homicide and 
Aggression 
Dr. Michael Woodworth 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm It Can Happen to Anyone 
(Part II) 
Dianne Sowden 
Project Resiliency 
D. Bassi, P. Thomas,  
D. Pearn, C. Pettit 
Fishing Upstream 
Dr. Matt Logan and  
Glen Flett 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
 
 
 
FRIDAY, April 30, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm The Mission Oriented Shooter:  
Case Studies of the Worst School and Campus Shootings; Implications for 
Law Enforcement, Mental Health and School Professionals 
Dr. Mary Ellen O’Toole 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
Honourable Kash Heed 
Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm False Allegation of Child Abduction: 
Lessons since Susan Smith 
Kathleen E. Canning 
 Break 
2:15 pm – 4:00 pm Psychiatric Issues in Murder cases 
Wendy Dawson, QC, Dr. Matt Logan, Dr. Lohrasbe 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
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THURSDAY, April 29, 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm Engaging with Youth  
Andrée Cazabon – Filmmaker and former street youth 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
TCO 2 Presentation 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm 
It Can Happen to Anyone 
Diane Sowden 
BC’s Office to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons 
Victor Porter and 
Rosalind Currie 
Youth, Homicide and 
Aggression 
Dr. Michael Woodworth 
 Move to Afternoon Break Out Session 
2:30 pm – 3:30 pm It Can Happen to Anyone 
(Part II) 
Dianne Sowden 
Project Resiliency 
D. Bassi, P. Thomas,  
D. Pearn, C. Pettit 
Fishing Upstream 
Dr. Matt Logan and  
Glen Flett 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
 
 
 
FRIDAY, April 3 , 2010 
8:00 am – 9:00 am           Continental Breakfast 
9:00 am – 12:00 pm The Mission Oriented Shooter:  
Case Studies of the Worst School and Campus Shootings; Implications for 
Law Enforcement, Mental Health and School Professionals 
Dr. Mary Ellen O’Toole 
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Break  
Honourable Kash Heed 
Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
1:00 pm – 2:00 pm False Allegation of Child Abduction: 
Lessons since Susan Smith 
Kathleen E. Canning 
 Break 
2:15 pm – 4:00 pm Psychiatric Issues in Murder cases 
Wendy Dawson, QC, Dr. Matt Logan, Dr. Lohrasbe 
3:30 pm – 4:30 pm Meet the Speakers and Questions 
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POLICE OFFICER RATED 
ONE OF WORST JOBS
According  to a recent report in which 200 jobs were 
comprehensively analyzed, the job of police officer 
was ranked 180, near the bottom of worst jobs. The 
data for each job was divided into five key 
categories:
• work environment;
• physical demands;
• stress;
• income; and
• hiring outlook.
Each job received a score in each individual 
category which were then added together and then 
ranked from one to 200.  
“Of course every employee is different, and what 
you consider a ‘dream job’ might be someone else’s 
idea of a career nightmare,” said Andrew Schneider, 
author of the online article “Jobs Rated 2010: A 
Ranking of 200 Jobs From Best to Worst”. 
Below is a list of several selected jobs. The entire list 
is available online at www.careercast.com.
Ranking of Best to Worst Jobs
Rank Job Work
Environment
Physical 
Demands
Stress Income Hiring
Outlook
1 Actuary 179.440 3.97 20.187 $85,229 24.79 (very good)
7 Paralegal Assistant 263.820 5.79 23.084 $46,152 22.52 (very good)
29 Parole Officer 381.060 6.47 26.463 $46,169 12.19 (good)
52 Social Worker 550.420 5.47 47.633 $46,174 23.24 (very good)
57 School Principal 432.990 5.62 51.718 $84,121 7.71 (poor)
62 Judge (Federal) 655.980 5.09 46.676 $152,027 4.77 (poor)
80 Attorney 1261.500 6.09 64.337 $111,217 12.67 (good)
108 Guard 812.060 12.55 29.918 $24,129 16.79 (very good)
116 Teacher 709.600 11.87 51.003 $49,136 12.36 (good)
134 Undertaker 1015.400 15.15 46.962 $52,210 13.10 (good)
157 Corrections Officer 1646.750 13.41 64.694 $38,156 17.56 (very good)
175 Highway Patrol Officer 1733.400 17.63 60.651 $51,167 12.17 (good)
180 Police Officer 1877.850 22.63 93.893 $51,167 12.17 (good)
188 Firefighter 3314.030 43.23 110.936 $44,227 13.77 (good)
195 Garbage Collector 1368.320 36.55 42.760 $31,183 6.83 (poor)
200 Roustabout 1731.450 36.89 65.548 $31,133 -6.17 (very poor)
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POLICE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH: 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE ADMITTED
R. v. Blake, 2010 ONCA 1
The police obtained a search warrant 
to search the accused’s residence. The 
information to obtain the warrant 
included confidential information 
originating  from anonymous Crime 
Stoppers’ tips, known confidential informants of 
unproven reliability, and 
known confidential informants 
of proven reliability. As a 
result of the search the police 
found a large amount of cash, 
two pieces of crack cocaine, 
each weighing  about 27 grms. 
(hidden in the mattress of a 
bed), a note describing  an 
apparent drug  transaction, 
and other paraphernalia 
known to be commonly used 
by drug  traffickers (e.g. an x-acto knife blade and 
plastic baggies).
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge ruled the police had breached the accused’s 
Charter rights under s.8. Because the police and the 
Crown were under a legal obligation to protect the 
identity of confidential informants, some of the 
information supporting  the warrant was edited. The 
redacted version of the information had nothing  that 
could possibly identify various confidential sources. 
The judge found the remaining  information did not 
provide reasonable grounds on which a justice, 
acting  reasonably and judicially, could be satisfied 
that the statutory prerequisites to the issuance of a 
search warrant had been met.  Consequently, the 
Crown could not rely on the search warrant as 
justification for the constitutionality of the 
search.  Without the warrant, the search was 
unreasonable and violated the accused’s rights under 
s.8.  Applying  the s.24(2) analysis of the day, the 
judge admitted the evidence. The evidence was real 
non-conscriptive evidence that did not effect trial 
fairness.  And although the s.8  breach was “very 
serious”, the police had acted in “good faith” in their 
attempt to acquire legal authorization to conduct the 
search.  Finally, the evidence was crucial to the 
Crown’s case and the the charges were serious. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  crack cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  and breaching  his 
probation.  
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the evidence should have been 
excluded, particularly since the Supreme Court of 
Canada reformulated the approach to s. 24(2) in R. 
v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32. In describing  Grant as taking 
“a judicial wire brush to the 
20 years of jurisprudential 
gloss that had built up 
a r o u n d s . 2 4 ( 2 ) a n d 
scrubb[ing  it] down to the 
bare words of the section,” 
Justice Doherty found the 
e v i d e n c e w a s s t i l l 
admissible.  In Grant there 
were three relevant lines of 
i n q u i r y i d e n t i f i e d i n 
balancing  of the interests at 
play when s.24(2) is invoked:
the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct; 
the impact of the Charter violation on the 
Charter-protected interest of the accused; and 
society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits.  
Seriousness of the Breach
“The inquiry into the nature of the state 
conduct that resulted in a Charter 
breach seeks to place that conduct 
along  a continuum of misconduct,” 
said Justice Doherty, authoring  the 
judgment of the Court. “The graver the 
state’s misconduct the stronger the need 
to preserve the long- term repute o f the 
administration of justice by disassociating  the court’s 
processes from that misconduct. That disassociation 
is achieved by excluding  the evidentiary fruits of the 
state misconduct.”  
Here, the trial judge found the police acted in “good 
faith.” They tried to acquire legal authorization for 
“The graver the state’s misconduct the 
stronger the need to preserve the 
long-term repute of the administration 
of justice by disassociating the court’s 
processes from that misconduct ... by 
excluding the evidentiary fruits of the 
state misconduct.” 
Volume 10 Issue 1 - January/February 2010
PAGE 30
the search and were clearly aware of the need to 
obtain a warrant and proceeded accordingly. They 
did not act negligently or in ignorance of any of the 
applicable Charter requirements. A finding  of “good 
faith” reduces the need for the court to disassociate 
itself from the state conduct that resulted in the 
Charter infringement and supports the admissibility 
of the challenged evidence.  Justice Doherty also 
stated:
I can see no possible criticism of the police 
conduct on this trial record.  Throughout the 
process that culminated in the seizure of the 
evidence, they acted exactly as they were 
obligated to under the law. They were required 
to obtain a warrant before entering the 
residence.  They did so.  They were required to 
make full disclosure to the justice of the peace.  
There is no suggestion that they did not do 
so. The police, and later the Crown, were legally 
obligated to protect the identity of the 
confidential informants by removing all material 
from the information that could identify the 
informants before making that material available 
to the defence. They did that.  Given the manner 
in which the s. 8  claim was litigated, the police 
acted not only in good faith, but as required by 
the law. The police conduct in this case does not 
fit anywhere on the misconduct continuum 
described in Grant. …
The police conduct in this case is somewhat 
analogous to the conduct considered in cases 
where the police have gathered evidence 
according  to the law as it was understood at the 
time the evidence was gathered only to have the 
law changed or declared unconstitutional at 
some subsequent point, but before the evidence 
is tendered at trial….  In those cases, the police 
acted not only in good faith, but in accordance 
with the law as it stood at the time.  Under the 
Collins approach, real evidence obtained in this 
manner was inevitably admitted.
The nature of the state conduct resulting  in the 
constitutional infringement in this case seems to 
fall outside the paradigm described in Grant. If it 
is within that paradigm, it is clearly at the far end 
of the spectrum favouring admissibility.  The 
[accused] has not availed himself of the various 
options open to him that would potentially have 
allowed further assessment of the police 
conduct. In these circumstances it would be 
inappropriate to presume that the police did 
anything  other than conduct themselves in 
accordance with the applicable legal rules. 
[references omitted, paras. 25-27]
Impact of the Breach
In this case, the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interest of the accused pointed strongly 
toward exclusion of the evidence.  This 
was a “very serious breach” of the 
accused’s constitutional rights.  He 
had a high expectation of privacy in 
his own residence which was 
compromised by an intrusive and 
ex t en s ive po l i c e s ea rch .  “The 
powerfully-negative impact on the core of the 
[accused’s] legitimate privacy interests creates the 
risk that the admission of the fruits of the search 
could bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute,” said Justice Doherty. He continued:   
 
The seriousness of the impact of the breach on 
the [accused] is not mitigated by the fact that the 
police may have had reasonable and probable 
grounds when they obtained the warrant, but 
were unable to demonstrate those grounds at 
trial because of the confidential-informant 
privilege.  The Crown chose to proceed on the 
redacted information.  The assessments of 
whether there was a breach and of the impact of 
that breach on the [accused] must be measured 
against the substance of that redacted 
information. Assessed from that perspective, this 
was an extensive, unjustified search of the 
[accused’s] home.    [para. 29]
Society’s Interest in Adjudication 
Here, society’s interest in an adjudication on the 
merits would be seriously undercut where highly 
reliable and important evidence was 
excluded.   The the crack cocaine was 
entirely reliable and essential to the 
Crown’s case. The charge was also a 
s e r i o u s o n e , a l t h o u g h t h e 
seriousness of the charge will “cut 
both ways” when assessing  society’s 
interest in an adjudication on the merits.  
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The nature of the state conduct and society’s interest 
in an adjudication on the merits militated strongly in 
favour of admitting  the evidence while the impact 
on the accused’s s.8 rights pointed strongly toward 
exclusion.  However, on balance, “the exclusion of 
reliable crucial evidence in circumstances where the 
propriety of the police conduct stands unchallenged 
would, viewed reasonably and from a long-term 
perspective, have a negative effect on the repute of 
the administration of justice.” The evidence was 
admissible. The Court did warn, however, that if 
there were a taint of impropriety, or even inattention 
to constitutional standards, to be found in the police 
conduct, the scales may be tipped in favour of 
exclusion, given the very deleterious effect on the 
accused’s legitimate privacy interests. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OFFICER KNEW OR OUGHT TO 
HAVE KNOWN THE LAW:
HANDGUNS EXCLUDED
R. v. Reddy, 2010 BCCA 11
At about 5:30 p.m. a police officer 
received a radio dispatch that 
someone called 9-1-1 to report that 
two “suspicious males” had been 
sitting  in a vehicle parked on the 
street for several hours.  The vehicles were described 
as an older model Dodge and a newer model 
Mercedes. The caller thought the men might be 
selling  drugs and wanted the police to check them 
out. The officer drove to the area and saw two 
vehicles matching  the description—the Dodge was 
parked behind the Mercedes.  As he drove by, the 
officer noticed two men sitting  in the front seat of 
the Dodge.  He drove around the block and pulled 
his vehicle in behind.  The officer approached the 
driver’s side, while a another officer, who arrived as 
backup, approached the passenger side.
The driver’s seat of the Dodge was fully reclined and 
the front passenger seat was upright.  The accused, 
seated in the driver’s seat, was wearing  a thin red 
track jacket. He was asked to produce identification 
but said he didn’t have any. He did, however, 
provide his name, date of birth, and address. The 
officer recalled the accused’s name in connection 
with an incident about eight months earlier where 
the accused was a passenger in a vehicle being 
driven by a prohibited driver and in which six 
machetes were found under the driver’s seat. When 
asked what he was doing, the accused said he was 
waiting  for a friend, who lived nearby, to return 
home and pointed to the house. The officer 
recognized the house as the residence of a person 
whom he knew to be a drug  dealer.  The accused 
said it was too hot to wait inside the house, so he 
had come outside.   He said that he had been sitting 
in the Dodge for about seven minutes before the 
police officers arrived.
A computer check disclosed that the Dodge was 
registered to an older Asian male and that the 
accused had a probation order with a condition that 
he not possess any cellular telephones or pagers, nor 
was he to be in a vehicle containing  cellular 
telephones or pagers. The officer returned to the 
driver’s side of the Dodge and directed the accused 
to step out of the vehicle. The officer told the 
accused that he had conditions for cell phones or 
pagers and that car was going  to be checked to 
ensure there were none in it. The accused asked if 
he could remove his jacket, as it was hot out.  The 
officer agreed. The accused struggled to take-off the 
jacket and draped it over the driver’s seat.  As the 
accused was getting  out of the Dodge, the officer 
directed him to stand beside the curb.  When the 
officer crouched down to look under the driver’s 
seat, the accused bolted.  He was told to stop but 
kept running.  The officer began to pursue, but 
changed his mind because there were no arrest 
warrants outstanding, the conditions of probation 
were not particularly stringent, and he knew the 
accused’s identity. The officer went back to the 
Dodge to search it for a cell phone or pager and 
picked up the accused’s jacket. It felt heavy and in 
each pocket was a loaded handgun—a Beretta .380 
pistol and a Colt .45 pistol.  
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer said he decided to detain the accused “for 
investigation” and search the Dodge for cellular 
telephones and pagers. He considered that the 9-1-1 
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caller reported that two men had been waiting  in a 
vehicle for several hours, but the accused said that 
he had only been in the vehicle for seven minutes.  
He said he wanted to search under the seats or in 
the glove box for cell phones or pagers but that there 
was nothing  that indicated to him that the accused 
was about to commit an offence. The trial judge 
found the accused had been detained when he was 
directed to exit the vehicle so it could be searched, 
but that it was a lawful investigative detention. The 
accused’s articulable cause to detain for further 
investigation was based on the following: 
• The accused said they were there for seven 
minutes.  There was no reason to prefer the 
information from the anonymous complainant, 
but there was a basis for suspicion.
• The accused had no identification on him, nor 
was he the owner of the motor vehicle.  
• The accused said he was waiting  for a friend in 
the nearby house, which the officer believed 
was a house associated with drug dealing.  
• The officer had dealt with the accused some 
months previously where he had been a 
passenger in a car driven by a prohibited driver 
that had approximately six machetes under the 
driver’s seat.  
• The accused was on probation to keep the 
peace, be of good behaviour, and not possess 
cell phones, pagers, nor be found in a motor 
vehicle containing these things.
As for the search, the trial judge also found it to be 
proper. Although there was nothing  specific 
suspected, the officer was concerned about whether 
the accused was in compliance with his probation 
order and whether there were weapons in the 
vehicle, among  other things. “The courts rely on the 
p o l i c e t o m o n i t o r 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h 
probation orders and the 
public relies on the 
p o l i c e t o m a i n t a i n 
o r d e r , ” s a i d t h e 
j u d g e .  “ I n t h e 
c i rcumstances here , 
where a search of the 
vehicle and not the 
person would be only moderately intrusive, and 
where the vehicle was not even owned by the 
accused, a search, even for such cause and even 
though no specific offence was suspected, was 
justified.” But in this case the accused also fled the 
scene, which demonstrated a consciousness of guilt. 
“With the added ingredient of the flight,” noted the 
judge, “there is no question that the police had good 
cause to search the vehicle.” Since there were no 
Charter breaches the handguns were admissible. 
And even if the Charter was violated, the judge 
would have nonetheless admitted the guns under s.
24(2). The accused was convicted of two charges of 
carrying  a concealed weapon and two charges of 
carrying a firearm in a careless manner.  
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal contending, among  other grounds, 
that his rights under s.8  (unreasonable search or 
seizure) and s.9 (arbitrary detention) of the Charter 
were breached and that the handguns should have 
been excluded under s.24(2). In his view, he was 
detained when he was directed to get out of the car. 
Furthermore, he submitted that the officer had only a 
hunch he might be in breach of his probation order. 
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the 
accused was neither physically nor psychologically 
detained and, even if he was, it was not arbitrary. 
Detention
Justice Frankel, authoring  the majority judgment of 
the Court, first reviewed the test for determining 
whether a person has been detained. He noted it is 
“an objective one, although the particular 
circumstances and perceptions of the individual 
involved may be relevant.” Whether any particular 
encounter gives rise to detention depends on what 
occurred in the case.
Here, the officer was engaged in 
something  more than prel iminary 
investigative questioning. He did more 
than ask whether the accused was in 
possession of any cellular telephones or 
pagers.  He told the accused that he was 
going  to check the Dodge for cellular 
telephones and pagers and directed him to 
step out of the vehicle and stand beside 
“A reasonable person directed 
by a police officer to get out of 
a vehicle would not question or 
challenge the officer’s 
authority, but would comply in 
the belief that he or she had no 
other option.” 
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the curb. The accused complied by getting  out and 
moving  where he was directed. And the fact the 
accused fled from the scene did not contradict the 
notion of psychological detention. At the time of 
flight the accused had already been detained. He 
had complied with two directions; to get out of the 
vehicle and stand at the curb. “A reasonable person 
directed by a police officer to get out of a vehicle 
would not question or challenge the officer’s 
authority, but would comply in the belief that he or 
she had no other option,” said Justice Frankel. “That 
[the accused] did not remain at the curb for very 
long  does not negate the fact that he was detained at 
the beginning of his encounter with [the officer].”
The police have a common law power to detain a 
person for investigation if they have reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the detainee is involved in 
on-going  criminal activity.  And an officer invoking 
the power of investigative detention must 
subjectively believe that the requisite standard has 
been met. As well, the officer’s belief must be 
objectively reasonable. In this case the officer 
wanted to search the vehicle for cellular telephones 
and pagers.  However, there was nothing  in the 
officer’s evidence that he subjectively suspected that 
the accused was committing  any offence. And even 
if he expressly said that he subjectively suspected 
that there were cellular telephones and/or pagers in 
the Dodge, that suspicion would not have been 
objectively reasonable:
The fact that [the accused], who properly 
identified himself, was sitting  in someone else’s 
vehicle outside the home of a known drug 
dealer, and that his statement as to how long  he 
had been there conflicted with information 
provided by an unknown 9-1-1 caller, does not, 
in my view, support a reasonable suspicion that 
he was in breach of the terms of his probation 
order.  Nor does the additional fact that some 
eight months earlier [the accused] had been a 
passenger in a vehicle in which machetes had 
been found, lend support to a reasonable 
suspicion that [the accused] was in breach of the 
probation order. [para. 69]
Instead, the officer’s decision to detain and search 
was based solely on the probation order containing 
a no cellular telephones/no pagers condition and 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Detention
“In summary...,
1.  Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter refers to a suspension of the 
individual’s liberty interest by a 
significant physical or psychological restraint.  
Psychological detention is established either where the 
individual has a legal obligation to comply with the 
restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person 
would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he 
or she had no choice but to comply. 
2.  In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal 
obligation, it may not be clear whether a person has 
been detained.  To determine whether the reasonable 
person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude 
that he or she had been deprived by the state of the 
liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the 
following factors:
a)  The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as 
they would reasonably be perceived by the individual: 
whether the police were providing general assistance; 
maintaining general order; making general inquiries 
regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out the 
individual for focussed investigation.
b)  The nature of the police conduct, including the 
language used; the use of physical contact; the place 
where the interaction occurred; the presence of others; 
and the duration of the encounter.
c) The particular characteristics or circumstances of the 
individual where relevant, including age; physical 
stature; minority status; level of sophistication.” - 
Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Justice Charron in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC  32 at para. 44.
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that he wanted to check the vehicle for those items.  
All he had was a hunch or a bare suspicion. This was 
not sufficient to rise to the level of suspicion 
necessary to permit a police officer to interfere with 
someone’s liberty. Since there was no lawful basis 
for detention, it was arbitrary and breached s.9 of 
the Charter.  
Search
Searching  the vehicle to ensure compliance with a 
probation order on nothing  more than a hunch was 
unlawful. Justice Frankel noted:
[T]here is no support for the proposition that, 
when the police have a bare suspicion that a 
person in a vehicle is in breach of a condition of 
a probation order, they have authority to search 
that vehicle for evidence of that breach.  Further, 
even when police officers lawfully detain 
someone reasonably suspected of being in 
breach of a probation order, they do not have a 
general power to search incidental to that 
detention for evidence of the suspected breach.  
It is clear … that police officers may only 
conduct relatively non-intrusive protective 
searches incidental to a lawful investigative 
detention, and that such searches can be 
undertaken only when the officers have a 
reasonable basis for believing that their safety, or 
the safety of others, is at risk. More specifically 
… “[the decision to search] cannot be justified 
on the basis of a vague or non-existent concern 
for safety, nor can the search be premised upon 
hunches or mere intuition”. [refernces omitted, 
para. 73]
Here, the officers only (and stated) purpose was to 
determine whether the accused was in breach of the 
no cellular telephones/no pagers condition of his 
probation order.  There was no recognized 
warrantless search power, either common law or 
statutory to search in these circumstances. Nor did 
the accused’s flight from the scene make a 
difference. Although “flight can be both a subjective 
and objective factor in a reasonable belief or a 
reasonable suspicion determination,” the officer’s 
bare suspicion had not been elevated to a subjective 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was in breach 
of a condition of his probation order, and that 
cellular telephones or pagers would be found in the 
vehicle. And even if he did have both subjective and 
objective grounds for a reasonable suspicion by 
reason of flight, the officer never detained on the 
basis of that suspicion:
More importantly, in my view, [the accused’s] 
flight cannot be considered at all in determining 
whether a reasonable suspicion existed 
regarding  his involvement in criminal activity.  
The reason for this is that [the accused] was 
fleeing from an unlawful detention. As discussed 
above, [the officer] exceeded his powers when 
he directed [the accused] to get out of the 
Dodge and stand near the curb. [The accused] 
had every right to disregard those directions, and 
it would be wrong to use his eventual 
disobedience of them against him.   What 
occurred is comparable to a situation in which 
someone who refuses to comply with an order 
that a police officer has no authority to give is 
arrested for obstruction, and then searched 
incidental to that arrest.   As the officer was not 
in the execution of his duty when he gave the 
direction, the arrest would be unlawful, and so 
would the search. [para. 78]
Standing 
The Crown’s submission that the accused had no 
standing  to object to the search on the basis he had 
no privacy interest in the Dodge was rejected. 
Whether or not he had a personal privacy interest in 
the vehicle, he had a privacy interest in his jacket at 
the time it was searched. He removed his jacket and 
was not giving  up his privacy interest in it. Nor did 
he deliberately absent himself at the time of the 
search, abandon the jacket, or renounce any 
ownership interest in it.   His actions (flight) taken in 
response to an unlawful investigative detention 
against him could not be used to support a finding 
that he abandoned any privacy interest he had in 
items left behind. “To accept the Crown’s argument 
that [the accused], by acting  as he did in the face of 
an unlawful detention, lost his privacy interest in the 
jacket, would be to turn the law on its head,” said 
Justice Frankel. “It would mean that a person who 
refuses to submit to an unlawful interference with 
his or her constitutional rights would, by that act of 
refusal, be abandoning  other constitutional rights. 
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This is illogical, unprincipled, and not in keeping 
with a purposive interpretation of the Charter.” The 
search of the jacket violated the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights.
Exclusion of Evidence
Here, the majority excluded the evidence. Using  the 
three lines of inquiry under s.24(2) the admission of 
the evidence would bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute:
1. the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct (admission may send the message the 
just ice system condones serious s tate 
misconduct);
2. the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused (admission 
may send the message that individual rights 
count for little); and 
3. society’s interest in the adjudication of the case 
on its merits.
Seriousness of the Breach
Wilful or reckless disregard for Charter rights will 
tend to support exclusion of evidence. And where 
the departure from Charter standards is major in 
degree, or where the police knew (or should have 
known) that their conduct was not Charter-
compliant a court will be more concerned about 
dissociating  itself from the police conduct and 
excluding  the evidence. If, on the other hand, a 
breach was of a merely technical nature or the result 
of an understandable mistake, dissociation is much 
less of a concern.
In this case, the officer effected an investigative 
detention for no other purpose than to search the 
Dodge for cellular telephones and pagers.  This all 
occurred 11 months after the Supreme Court of 
Canada had released its seminal judgment on 
investigative detention in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52 
where the Court accepted that the police have the 
power, at common law, to detain individuals for an 
investigative purpose in the absence of grounds for 
an arrest, and also have a limited power to conduct 
incidental protective searches.  But in doing  so, the 
Court delineated the thresholds that must be met 
before either of those powers can be exercised. Thus, 
the police officers were not operating  in 
circumstances of considerable legal uncertainty:
The critical factor in situating [the officer’s] 
conduct along  that fault line [blameless conduct, 
through negligent conduct, to conduct 
demonstrating a blatant disregard for Charter 
rights] is that at the time of his encounter with 
[the accused] he either knew, or ought to have 
known, that he did not have the power (a) to 
detain someone for investigation on a bare 
suspicion that that person might be in breach of 
a condition of a probation order, or (b) to 
conduct a search incidental to an investigative 
detention that is unconnected to any safety 
concerns.  Whatever uncertainly may have 
existed with respect to those aspects of 
investigative detention had been swept away by 
Mann.   Although … instant knowledge of court 
decisions is not to be attributed to the police, 
they are expected to comply with those 
decisions within a reasonable time. … In [R. v. 
Brydges], the Supreme Court held that, by 
reason of s. 10(b) of the Charter, the police have 
a duty to advise a detainee of the existence and 
availability of legal aid plans and duty counsel.  
However, to give the police time to take the 
steps necessary to implement that decision the 
Court provided a 30-day transitional period. 
I am not suggesting that 30 days is the outside 
limit with respect to the time within which the 
police are expected to bring  their practices into 
conformity with pronouncements by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. In Brydges, the Court 
was of the view that 30 days was “sufficient time 
for the police forces to react, and to prepare new 
cautions”.  Other decisions may well take longer 
to implement such as, for example, where it is 
necessary for police forces to update their 
operations manuals, and provide training.  
However, in my view, 11 months was ample 
“Although … instant knowledge of court decisions is not to be attributed to the police, 
they are expected to comply with those decisions within a reasonable time.” 
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t ime for police officers to bring their 
investigative-detention practices into conformity 
with the dictates of Mann.  Accordingly, I 
consider the violation of [the accused’s] rights to 
lie at the serious end of the breach-spectrum. 
[references omitted, paras. 101-102]
Impact of the Breaches 
The accused “could reasonably expect that he 
would not, in the absence of lawful authority, be 
directed to get out of the vehicle in which he was 
sitting, and have his jacket searched.” The breaches 
were a significant, but not egregious, intrusion on 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests. 
Society’s Interest in Adjudication 
The guns were highly reliable evidence and critical 
to the prosecution of serious offences.  The public 
had an interest in the successful prosecution of 
persons who unlawfully carry loaded handguns. On 
the one hand “the dangers that such conduct creates 
cannot be overstated [but] the public also expects 
those engaged in law enforcement to respect the 
rights and freedoms we all enjoy by acting  within 
the limits of their lawful authority.”
In balancing  all the factors, the majority concluded 
that the repute of the administration of justice would 
be adversely affected by admitting  the handguns.  
The law relating  to investigative detentions was 
clear. “This failure to act in accordance with the 
limits set by the highest court in the land that tips the 
s.24(2) scales towards exclusion.” The handguns 
were excluded and the accused was acquitted. 
 
A Different View
Justice Hall was of the view that the detention of the 
accused was lawful. Although the officer should 
have advised the accused of his rights under s.10(b) 
at the time of detention (when told to get out of the 
car), there were no ss.8 or 9 breaches. This was not a 
random stop or groundless search of a vehicle nor 
was it a situation where the police had no reason to 
suspect any criminal activity. The officer was 
focussed on possible possession of paraphernalia 
prohibited by the terms of his probation.  “The 
information in hand, including  the proximity of the 
parties to the drug  house, made it entirely 
appropriate for the officer to undertake a search of 
the vehicle,” said Justice Hall.  
As for the s. 10(b) breach it was primarily theoretical 
since almost immediately upon exiting  the car, the 
accused fled. “His actions were not indicative of any 
likelihood that he would have been interested in 
consulting  counsel,” said Justice Hall. “His action of 
running  away from the scene also afforded a 
sensible reason for the officer to carry on with some 
examination of the vehicle, for it was a fair inference 
that the car contained something  illegal that 
motivated the [accused] to flee, presumably to 
escape apprehension.” He added:
The police did not act in an oppressive or 
cavalier fashion and had an articulated reason to 
detain the accused and enter upon a search of 
the vehicle.  The fruits of the search were the two 
handguns found in the jacket the [accused] had 
just removed and left in the vehicle.   It perhaps 
bears observing that if the police had been 
supine in this instance and not pursued an 
investigation and, later, one of the guns was 
employed (not, unfortunately, an uncommon 
scenario in the drug  world), the public would be 
extremely critical of such police action or more 
properly inaction. [para. 144]
In weighing  all of the s.24(2) factors, the nature of 
the police conduct, the search being  relatively non-
intrusive (search of a vehicle) and the nature of the 
offence disclosed, the evidence should have been 
admitted. The lapses of police conduct were not at 
the extreme end of the scale, the search was in no 
way personal or intrusive, and the guns were highly 
reliable. “A factor here in considering  the repute of 
the administration of justice is that there has been an 
unfortunate level of gun violence in the Lower 
Mainland area of British Columbia in the recent 
past. To order the exclusion of the evidence in this 
case would in my opinion do harm to the repute of 
the administration of justice, whereas the admission 
of the evidence would enhance the repute of the 
administration of justice.” Justice Hall would have 
dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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POLICE MUST PROVE ARREST 
LAWFUL FOR EXCEPTION TO 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
R. v. Besharah, 2010 SKCA 2
 
A police officer randomly stopped a 
motorist for the purposes of a sobriety 
check. On approaching  the vehicle 
the officer smelled a strong  odour of 
raw cannabis marijuana and arrested 
the accused for possession. He then searched the 
vehicle to locate the marijuana. After about 30 
minutes the police found 19.6 grms. of marihuana 
inside a black duffel bag  lying  in the box of the 
accused’s truck. Ecstasy was also found.
 
At trial in Saskatchewan 
Provincial Court the accused 
sought to challenge the 
admissibility of the evidence 
arguing  he had been subject 
to a warrantless search, a 
presumptively unreasonable 
one under s.8 of the Charter. 
The Crown argued that the 
search was incident to lawful 
arrest so no warrant was 
required. The trial judge 
placed the onus on the 
accused to establish the 
unlawfulness of his arrest, 
but found the arrest was 
lawful because the officer 
smelled raw marihuana and 
t h e a c c u s e d f a i l e d t o 
establish, on a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the search and seizure was unlawful. The accused 
was convicted of possessing  marihuana and 
possessing ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.
 
On appeal by the accused to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Queen’s Bench the convictions were 
overturned. The appeal judge ruled that the accused 
was denied the opportunity to challenge the 
credibility of the arresting  officer, rendering  the trial 
unfair. Had he been permitted to cross examine the 
officer, the defence would have raised the following 
circumstances to challenge the officer’s credibility:
• Suggesting  the officer knew or knew of the 
accused before the vehicle stop and had earlier 
dealings with him;
• Questioning  whether a sobriety check was the 
real reason for the stop;
• The officer testified to “a very strong  and 
overpowering  smell of raw marihuana” but his 
notes only said “odour of mj”;
• Following  arrest, it took about half an hour to 
locate a relatively small amount of marihuana, 
inconsistent with a “strong  and overpowering” 
odour.
 
As a result, a new trial was ordered. 
The Crown then appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the onus on 
proving  an unlawful arrest fell on 
the accused.
 
The initial burden on proving  a 
Charter violation lies with the 
accused (applicant) but that burden 
may shift to the Crown. Once an 
accused has demonstrated that a 
search was warrantless, the burden 
then shifts to the Crown to show 
that it was reasonable. A search will 
be reasonable if it is (1) authorized 
by law, (2) the law is reasonable, 
and (3) the manner in which the 
search was carr ied out was 
reasonable.
 
In this case, the Crown contended that once it was 
asserted that the search was conducted an an 
incident to a lawful arrest it is brought within an 
exception to the presumption that a warrantless 
search is unreasonable. Thus, the accused needed to 
establish that the officer lacked the necessary 
reasonable grounds to justify the arrest. Justice Smith 
however, delivering  the opinion of the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal, disagreed.
 
In the Court’s view, rather than the accused 
establishing  that the officer did not have reasonable 
“[T]he statement that “searches 
of the person incident to arrest 
are an established exception to 
the general rule that warrantless 
searches are prima facie 
unreasonable”, does not mean 
that the mere allegation, by the 
police or the Crown, that a 
search was incident to a lawful 
arrest is sufficient to remove any 
onus from the Crown where the 
lawfulness of the arrest ... is 
challenged by the accused.”
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grounds, the Crown needed to establish that 
requirements for a lawful arrest had been met—that 
the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
accused was committing  or had committed an 
indictable offence:
 
[T]he statement that “searches of the person 
incident to arrest are an established exception to 
the general rule that warrantless searches are 
prima facie unreasonable”, does not mean that 
the mere allegation, by the police or the Crown, 
that a search was incident to a lawful arrest is 
sufficient to remove any onus from the Crown 
where the lawfulness of the arrest (or whether 
the search was truly incident to the arrest) is 
challenged by the accused. Rather, the point of 
the statement is simply to confirm that the 
common law power of search incident to arrest 
is sufficient to satisfy the first two of the criteria 
set out in Collins, that the search is authorized 
by law and that the law itself is reasonable, 
sufficient to displace the presumption of 
unreasonableness, where the lawfulness of the 
arrest and that the search was properly 
incidental to the arrest are established.  
[emphasis in original, para. 25]
 
And further:
 
Where the lawfulness of the police arrest is put 
at issue on a Charter challenge, as it was here, 
the onus must fall on the Crown through police 
witnesses to establish that the police had 
subjectively and objectively reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest, for, as a 
practical matter, this proposition is asserted and 
relied upon by the Crown and is within the 
peculiar knowledge of the police. Thus, fairness 
requires that the burden of proving this matter 
fall on the Crown and that the accused have an 
opportunity to challenge the police evidence by 
way of cross-examination.  This logic applies 
where the police have justified a search of the 
accused as a search incident to arrest, whether 
or not the accused has also challenged the 
lawfulness of the arrest pursuant to s. 9 of the 
Charter. While it is true that search incident to a 
lawful arrest is an exception to the general rule 
that a warrantless search is prima facie 
unreasonable, it is for the Crown to establish that 
the pre-requisites for the exception have been 
satisfied. [para. 35]
 
Here, the trial judge erred in holding  that the 
accused had the evidential and persuasive burden to 
establish that the police officer lacked reasonable 
grounds for his arrest. In addition, the trial judge 
erred in placing  the onus on the accused to establish 
the unlawfulness of his arrest in the circumstances of 
this case. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the 
order for a new trial was upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGAL LESSON LEARNED
Search Incident To Arrest
A warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable;
However, a search incident to lawful arrest is an 
exception to this long standing presumption;
In establishing that the search was valid as an 
incident to arrest the onus is on the Crown (of 
course through police evidence) to establish 
that the arrest was based on reasonable 
grounds. The onus is not on the accused to 
establish that reasonable grounds did not exist. 
R. v. Besharah, 2010 SKCA 2
“Where the lawfulness of the police arrest is put at issue on a Charter challenge, as it was 
here, the onus must fall on the Crown through police witnesses to establish that the police 
had subjectively and objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, for, as a 
practical matter, this proposition is asserted and relied upon by the Crown and is within the 
peculiar knowledge of the police.”
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OFFICER NEED NOT QUESTION 
DRIVER ABOUT LAST DRINK
R. v. Smith, 2009 SKCA 139
 
The accused was stopped a few 
blocks from a bar where he had 
been. He said he had consumed four 
or five drinks and the last one was 
about five minutes before leaving  the 
bar. An approved screening  device (ASD) test was 
administered and the accused failed. The 
breathalyzer demand was then made and the 
accused was taken to the police detachment where 
he subsequently provided samples of breath over the 
legal limit. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the officer 
testified he did not know how much time had 
elapsed from the time the accused left the bar until 
he was stopped. The officer also said he was aware 
of the 15 minute waiting  period recommended in 
the ASD user’s manual from the time of last drink to 
minimize the possibility of residual alcohol 
providing  a falsely high reading. The ASD user’s 
manual was also put into evidence. By filling  in the 
time gaps of the evidence with speculation, the trial 
judge concluded that the test was administered 
within 11 or 12 minutes after the accused consumed 
alcohol. Since the ASD test was conducted within 
15 minutes of the accused consuming  alcohol the 
officer did not administer the ASD test in 
compliance with s.254(2) of the Criminal Code. 
Without the ASD fail results, the officer would not 
have had the necessary grounds for a breathalyzer 
demand. The accused’s Charter rights were 
breached, the certificate of analysis was excluded, 
and he was acquitted. 
 
The Crown’s appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench was successful. Although there was 
the possibility that the accused had consumed 
alcohol within 15 minutes of the test, the possibility 
did not preclude the officer from relying  on the 
accuracy of the results. The appeal judge found there 
was no evidence as to how much time elapsed 
between the accused leaving  the bar and being 
stopped by the police. Further, the officer was alive 
to the issue of residual mouth alcohol but could not 
establish if exactly 15 minutes had elapsed since he 
had no way of knowing  how long  the accused had 
been in his truck before being  stopped. There was no 
Charter breach and a new trial was ordered. 
On appeal by the accused to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal, the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. The onus of proving  a Charter breach lay 
with the accused, which he failed to do. Justice 
Sherstobitoff, writing  the judgment of the Court, 
stated:
The first [principle relevant to this case] is that 
an investigating officer need not question a 
suspect with respect to when he last drank. The 
second is that the mere possibility that a suspect 
may have drunk alcohol within the 15 minutes 
preceding  the administration of the ASD test, 
does not preclude an officer from requiring a 
suspect to take the test and to rely on the result, 
where the officer acts bona fide. [references 
omitted, para. 7]
Here, there was no evidence as to how much time 
had elapsed between the time the accused left the 
bar and the time he was stopped. The trial judge 
erred in finding  the officer knew or should have 
known that the accused had ingested alcohol within 
15 minutes preceding  the test. The accused was the 
only person who knew this but he chose not to say 
anything  to the officer or give evidence in the voir 
dire at trial. The officer did not need to do more by 
way of enquiry and acted bona fide in administering 
the test. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETENTION NOT ARBITRARY:
AMPLE FOUNDATION FOR 
CONTINUED DETENTION
R. v. Simms, 2009 ABCA 260
 
The police tracked the accused to a 
rink after he was was involved in an 
accident and left the scene. He had 
a bad gash on his forehead, 
displayed many signs of intoxication 
such as a strong  odour of alcohol, trouble standing, 
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speaking, or holding  a simple object, and he was 
uncooperative. When an ambulance attended he 
refused treatment. The police took the accused to the 
hospital where a doctor sewed up a wide, bleeding 
gash to his forehead. When he tried leaving  the 
hospital through doors clearly marked “no exit”, he 
walked into a glass wall. He could not walk straight 
or talk properly. At the police station, the accused at 
first refused the offer to use a phone to call a lawyer, 
but later accepted it and placed a call. He remained 
uncooperative and did not provide a breath sample. 
His truck was still parked in a parking  lot, and he did 
not ask to have anyone pick him up. Since there was 
a little dog  in the truck, and it was below freezing, 
police called the accused’s wife and told her where 
the truck was. The wife did not ask or suggest about 
coming  to get her husband. He was charged with 
impaired driving and dangerous driving. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the officer 
testified that it would not be safe for the accused, or 
for others, that he be released on his own. He could 
go back to the parking  lot and drive his truck or, 
based on his earlier conduct, could easily hurt 
himself if left unattended. Although the officer 
believed that it would be safe to release the accused 
into the custody of some sober, responsible adult, 
the question did not arise - no one asked about it 
nor suggested it, nor did the officer raise the topic 
with the accused or his wife. With respect to the 
wife, the officer said he preferred to let the wife raise 
the topic of bringing  her husband home rather than 
volunteering  the suggestion. The judge held that the 
post-investigative detention of the accused in cells 
was not arbitrary and was lawful since it was 
necessary in the public interest to prevent the 
commission of another offence. The accused’s 
request for a stay of proceedings was dismissed. He 
was convicted of the impaired driving charge. 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench arguing  the trial judge erred in 
examining  only the subjective belief of the 
investigating  officer without verifying  whether there 
was an objective basis for that belief. The accused’s 
appeal, however, was dismissed. 
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the lower court erred in 
finding  that the officer had an honest, reasonably 
held belief that his continued detention was 
necessary, that such a belief, if honest, was not 
objectively reasonable, and that the accused or his 
family had the onus of requesting his release. 
Arbitrary Detention
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal concluded there was no 
s.9 Charter breach. The detention in this case was 
not without grounds or without evidence, nor 
illogical or capricious. “The circumstances at and 
before arrest, and what the constable saw at the rink, 
and then the hospital, gave ample foundation for his 
conclusion that it would be unsafe for all concerned 
to let the accused out on his own,” said the Court. 
Nor did the trial judge overlook the second branch 
of the test for detention under s.497 of Criminal 
Code - reasonable grounds for the officer’s belief. 
She discussed the appropriate authorities and the 
evidence proved the reasonableness of the 
detention. And further:
 
Section 497 of the Criminal Code was not the 
only legal basis to detain the accused. Alberta’s 
Gaming and Liquor Act..., s. 115 allows release 
of someone found intoxicated in a public place 
(as here) who is not charged with that. But that is 
to take place once the detainee has recovered 
enough that he is not likely to injure himself or 
be a danger, nuisance or disturbance to others, 
or once there is an undertaking by someone else 
to care for the detainee. Plainly neither branch 
was satisfied here. [para. 17]
                                                       
Onus to Request Release
The accused’s suggestion that the police had a legal 
duty to tell the detainee that he would be released 
from custody if he produced a suitable, sober adult 
to take him home was also rejected. The Court 
stated:
 
Showing such a duty in circumstances described 
by section 497 of the Criminal Code might be an 
uphill fight, for two reasons.
 
(a) Counsel can find no authority for such a duty, 
and
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(b) The analogy of s. 10(b) of the Charter is 
prayed, but fails. That section expressly gives a 
duty to tell the suspect about the right to 
counsel, whereas s. 9 of the Charter does not 
mention informing the accused about any right.
 
The defence submissions here encounter a 
bigger problem. There can be a Charter breach 
only if s. 9 of the Charter is violated. A mere 
breach of the Criminal Code is not what the 
accused’s counsel alleges, and besides it would 
do him no good on this appeal. He wants a 
Charter remedy. And the Code does not impose 
a duty to inform.
 
Section 9 of the Charter forbids only arbitrary 
detention. If there is no detention, there cannot 
be arbitrary detention. If some previous omission 
is complained of, it cannot be detention (let 
alone arbitrary detention) unless it had some sort 
of role or effect in creating a later detention. 
[paras. 23-25]
 
In this case there was “no evidence that the accused 
could or would have got anyone to take him home, 
nor even that he wanted to. His wife did not raise 
the topic when she spoke to the police and did not 
even ask a question. And she did not testify at trial. 
Nor did anyone testify that she or any other friend, 
relative or employee was available, had a vehicle, 
had a driver’s licence, or was willing  to take the 
accused home. The accused failed to prove a 
Charter violation.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
 s. 115 Alberta’s Gaming and Liquor Act
Taking intoxicated person into custody
s.115(1) No person may be intoxicated 
in a public place.
(2)    If a peace officer on reasonable 
and probable grounds believes that a 
person is intoxicated in a public place, the peace 
officer may, instead of charging the person with an 
offence, take the person into custody to be dealt with 
in accordance with this section.
(3)    A person in custody pursuant to subsection (2) 
may be released from custody at any time if on 
reasonable and probable grounds the person 
responsible for the custody believes that
(a) the person in custody has recovered sufficient 
capacity that, if released, the person is unlikely to 
injury himself or herself or be a danger, nuisance 
or disturbance to others, or
(b) a person capable of taking  care of the person 
taken into custody undertakes to take care of that 
person.
WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of it’s 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Counselling  for post-traumatic stress disorder 
Michael J. Scott and Stephen G. Stradling.
London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 
2006.
RC 552 P67 S35 2006
Elder abuse: the hidden crime  
written by Judith Wahl and Sheila Purdy; illustrations 
by Yvonne Nowicka].
Toronto, Ont.: Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, 
c2008.
HV 6626.3 W234 2008
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Families, youth and delinquency: the state of 
knowledge, and family-based juvenile 
delinquency prevention programs  
Julie Savignac.
Ottawa: National Crime Prevention Centre, c2009.
HV 9069 F365 2009
For our own safety: examining  the safety of 
high-risk interventions for children and 
young people 
edited by Michael A. Nunno, David M. Day, & Lloyd 
B. Bullard.
Arlington, VA: Child Welfare League of America, 
c2008.
HV 965 F67 2008
Hidden evidence: the story of forensic 
science and how it helped to solve 50 of the 
world's toughest crime
David Owen.
Richmond Hill, Ont.: Firefly Books, 2009.
HV 8073 O93 2009
High-rise security and fire life safety
Geoff Craighead.
Amsterdam; Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann/
Elsevier, c2009.
TH 9745 S59 C73 2009
"Operation Praetorian": a new look at twenty 
first century police leadership development 
by Edward Illi.
[Victoria, B.C.] : Royal Roads University, c2007.
HV 8160 S23 I456 2007
Reasonable use of force by police: seizures, 
firearms, and high-speed chases 
David A. May & James E. Headley.
New York: P. Lang, c2008.
HV 7923 M39 2008
Stalking, threatening, and attacking  public 
figures: a psychological and behavioral 
analysis 
edited by J. Reid Meloy, Lorraine Sheridan, Jens 
Hoffmann.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, c2008.
HV 6594 S742 2008
Training  strategies for crisis and hostage 
negotiations: scenario writing  and creative 
variations for role play 
by Arthur A. Slatkin.
Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, c2009.
HV 8058 S55 2009
Traumatic stress in police officers: a career-
length assessment from recruitment to 
retirement 
by Douglas Paton ... [et al.].
Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, c2009.
HV 7936 J63 T73 2009
Youth & crime 
John Muncie.
Los Angeles; London: SAGE, c2009.
HV 9145 A5 M87 2009
JIBC Library Contact:
Email: library@jibc.ca
Phone: 604-528-5599
Website: http://www.jibc.ca/Library/
Library Hours:
• Monday, Thursday, Friday 8am-5pm
• Tuesday & Wednesday 8am-8pm (extended hours 
until April 28th)
• Saturday 9am-4pm (until June)
UNENCLOSED SPACE 
NOT A ‘PLACE’
R. v. Ausland, 2010 ABCA 17
Two men were observed backing  a 
tractor unit up to a chain between 
two cement posts. This chain, 
secured by a padlock, was the only 
thing  that controlled access and 
egress to an unfenced yard used for the purpose of 
storing  trailers. No physical barriers impeded 
pedestrian access but the yard was patrolled by 
security guards and cameras. The men cut the chain 
and backed the tractor unit up to a trailer parked in 
the lot. The tractor and trailer were connected and 
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the unit was ready to be pulled. But police arrived in 
response to an emergency call and intercepted the 
thieves. Although nothing  was removed from the 
yard the accused was charged with breaking  and 
entering  a place and committing  a theft therein, and 
theft over $5,000. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge found 
the storage yard to be a “place” and convicted the 
accused of breaking  and entering. He was also 
found guilty of theft over $5,000 but that charge was 
stayed under the Kienapple principle. 
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that he did not break and 
enter a “place” as defined in s.348(3) of the Criminal 
Code. Under the Criminal Code, a “place” is defined 
to mean, among  other things, “a building  or 
structure or any part thereof, other than a dwelling 
house.” This definition required the Crown to prove 
that the yard was a “structure” within the statutory 
meaning of “place”.
Although the Court of Appeal accepted that the 
word “structure” had a broad and liberal 
interpretation, it concluded  the unenclosed parking 
lot was not a “structure”:
It is apparent from [case law] that the courts, in 
dealing  with the break and enter sections of the 
Code, have interpreted the word “structure” to 
include, in certain circumstances, spaces 
enclosed by a fence. In our view, however, to 
extend the meaning  further to include 
unenclosed spaces, like the yard in the present 
case, would go too far and rob the word 
“structure” of any effective meaning. At the very 
least, a structure must be something  that can be 
broken into and entered. In this case, entry to 
the lot could have been gained by simply 
walking  around the barrier created by the chain. 
… The fact that the yard is patrolled does not 
convert an open space into a structure. [para. 
11]
Thus, the trial judge erred in convicting  the accused 
of breaking  and entering  by holding  that the 
unenclosed storage yard was a “place”. However, 
the offence of theft over $5,000 was proven. Even 
though the trailer was not removed from the yard, 
the definition of “theft” includes moving  something 
or causing  it to move or to be moved, or beginning 
to cause it to become movable with the intent to 
steal it. Here, the accused was in the course of 
causing  the trailer to become movable. The 
conviction of break, enter and theft was set aside 
and a conviction for theft was entered.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
“Place” - s.348(3) Criminal Code
“place” means
(a) a dwelling-house;
(b) a building or structure or any part 
thereof, other than a dwelling-house;
(c) a railway vehicle, a vessel, an 
aircraft or a trailer; or
(d) a pen or an enclosure in which fur-bearing 
animals are kept in captivity for breeding or 
commercial purposes.
Thus, a place for the purpose of break and enter 
under s.348  does not include a motor vehicle. But 
under s.98, a place for the offence of breaking  and 
entering to steal a firearm “means any building or 
structure — or part of one — and any motor vehicle, 
vessel, aircraft, railway vehicle, container or trailer.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Circumstantial Evidence
“Any one piece of Crown 
circumstantial evidence may 
leave a huge doubt. But eight or 
ten may yield an ironclad case 
for the Crown.”  - Alberta Court of Appeal Justice 
Cote in R.  v.  Currie, 2008 ABCA 374 at para. 20.
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DRA TECHNOLOGY BREACHES 
HOMEOWNER’S PRIVACY 
INTEREST
R. v. Gomboc, 2009 ABCA 276
While investigating  an unrelated 
matter in a neighbourhood, a police 
officer noticed that the windows of 
the accused’s house were covered 
with condensation, the curtains 
stained with moisture, and the roof was free of snow, 
distinguishing  it from the surrounding  homes. Two 
drug  unit officers were assigned to investigate and 
noted the smell of “growing” marihuana, 
condensation on the windows, considerable 
moisture being  vented through the chimney and 
under the deck, unusual ice buildup around the 
vents located on the roof when the weather turned 
cold, and the house appeared to be sweating 
profusely. These observations led police to believe 
that the accused had a marihuana grow operation in 
his home.
The officers requested the electrical service provider 
in the area install a digital recording  ammeter (DRA), 
which would create a record of when the electrical 
power was consumed at the accused’s property. The 
DRA is attached at the power box or transformer site 
of the powerline feeding  into a residence. No 
warrant was used and, after a five-day period, police 
were provided with a graph printout suggesting  the 
electrical use was consistent with a marihuana grow 
operation. Using  this information and their earlier 
observations the police obtained a search warrant 
and found a marihuana grow operation consisting  of 
two–stages involving  hundreds of marihuana plants. 
The police seized 165.3 kgs. of bulk marihuana, 
206.8 grms. of processed and bagged marihuana, as 
well as numerous items related to the grow 
operation. In addition, the police seized various 
documents confirming  the accused’s ownership and 
use of the premises. He was charged accordingly.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued the DRA evidence breached his 
rights under s.8. of the Charter because its use 
involved an unwarranted and unreasonable search 
and that the evidence obtained should have been 
excised from the information to obtain the search 
warrant. Without the DRA information, he claimed 
the search warrant could not have issued and all the 
evidence discovered in execution of the warrant 
should be excluded under s.24(2). The Crown 
conceded that without the DRA record, there was 
insufficient evidence to secure a search warrant but 
that its use was not a search or seizure. Thus, no 
judicial authorization was required to install the 
DRA and record the power consumption. 
The trial judge ruled that a resident of a house did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
computerized electricity records maintained by the 
utility company and the information provided by the 
DRA was not of such a personal or confidential 
nature to give rise to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The Alberta Code of Conduct Regulation 
pursuant to the Electrical Utilities Act, in the judge’s 
view, diminished any reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to electrical consumption 
information and permitted disclosure of electricity 
consumption by a utility to the police for the 
purpose of investigating  an offence, if the disclosure 
was not contrary to the express request of the 
customer. The accused was convicted of producing 
marihuana and possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Justice Martin, writing  the majority opinion of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal, concluded that “the 
information obtained from the DRA was subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, that its collection 
and disclosure to the police amounted to a search, 
and that the search was unreasonable in the absence 
of prior judicial authorization.” In his view, the 
accused had a subjective expectation of privacy that 
was objectively reasonable and it was violated by 
police conduct. Using  the “totality of the 
circumstances test”, the majority focused on the 
accused’s informational privacy in activities taking 
place in his home. 
Comparing  it to FLIR technology, which the majority 
noted was non intrusive and basically meaningless, 
DRA technology is not only different but more 
intrusive and more revealing: 
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Here, the expert evidence confirmed that a DRA 
records the flow of electricity to a residence over 
a period of time. In doing so, it measures the 
amount of electricity being  used at a given point, 
based on one amp increments. While the DRA 
does not indicate the source of electrical 
consumption within the residence, it produces 
information as to the amount of electricity being 
used in a home and when it is being  used, all 
over a significant period of time. A pattern of 
excessive electrical use over a 12-hour or 18-
hour cycle indicates to the police that a 
marihuana grow operation is likely being 
undertaken at the subject property, as marihuana 
is typically grown indoors using 12 or 18-hour 
light cycles.
DRA information must, as a matter of common 
sense, also disclose biographical or private 
information; for example, the approximate 
number of occupants, when they are present in 
the home, and when they are awake or asleep. 
This applies to all homes, regardless as to 
whether they are being used for marihuana grow 
operations. …
Even if the DRA records did not disclose 
personal information, the information obtained 
may nonetheless be of the type that is subject to 
a homeowner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. .. As my colleague has observed, 
information that does not disclose “core 
‘biographical’ information,” such as electrical 
s ignals emanat ing f rom a home, may 
nonetheless remain subject to an expectation of 
privacy where it is reasonably intended to 
remain private. [references omitted, paras. 
16-18]
The accused’s expectation of privacy was also 
objectively reasonable. “In my view, the informed 
homeowner would share the [accused’s] expectation 
of privacy, particularly in the absence of any judicial 
oversight,” said Justice Martin. He continued: 
[T]he police wanted the DRA information to find 
out what was happening  in the [accused’s] home 
– a place where the [accused’s] expectation of 
privacy was high and objectively reasonable.
In my opinion, the expectation of privacy 
extends beyond simply the information as to the 
timing and the amount of electricity used. It is 
also objectively reasonable to expect that the 
utility would not be co-opted by the police to 
gather additional information of interest only to 
the police, without judicial authorization. 
Indeed, I expect that the reasonable, informed 
citizen would be gravely concerned, and would 
object to the state being allowed to use a utility 
to spy on a homeowner in this way.
It is useful to recall that the [accused’s] 
relationship with the utility provider was born of
modern necessity; it was not feasible for him to 
generate his own electricity or to go without. So 
the [accused] agreed to a standard electrical 
service arrangement with Enmax, whereby the 
latter would supply electricity to the his home in 
exchange for payment for that service. In this 
way, Enmax received access to the [accused’s] 
property to install the necessary equipment to 
supply his house with electricity, and continued 
to have restricted access to check and maintain 
the equipment. It is reasonable to infer that 
access would not otherwise have been allowed. 
… Given that access would not have been 
available to the police without the [accused’s] 
consent or invitation (and there is no evidence to 
suggest that either would have been granted), it 
is my view that an informed homeowner would 
strongly object to the police use of the utility’s 
access and technology to generate a record of 
electrical use solely for the benefit of a police 
investigation. [paras. 21-22]
And the information obtained by a DRA was found 
to be significantly different than the billing  records 
routinely produced and retained by a utility 
company in the normal course of its business. In this 
case, the police were not interested in monthly 
billings or other pre-existing  information gathered by 
the utility. Instead, police asked the utility to use 
DRA technology that it would not normally use to 
generate information that the utility had no interest 
in. Nor did the Regulations diminish the accused’s 
expectation of privacy. “In my opinion, the 
Regulations must be strictly construed, and not 
interpreted to imply the homeowner’s consent in 
allowing  the utility to gather, at the behest of the 
state, information that is not useful to his or her 
relationship with the utility,” said Justice Martin. 
“The Regulations cannot mean that the utility can be 
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used, without judicial authorization, as an 
investigative arm of the police to gather evidence 
about what is happening  inside the home, unless the 
consumer has forbidden it.” 
Trespassing on a homeowner’s property is 
conduct the police themselves are not permitted 
to engage in … and I do not understand that the 
Regulations were intended, nor constitutionally 
able, to empower police agents to do what they 
themselves can not legally do. In my opinion, 
the Regulations do no more than permit the 
utility to share pre-existing customer information 
with the police unless the customer has 
objected.
If it were otherwise, the police could recruit any 
agency with limited access to a home to exploit 
that access to gather information for them. For 
example, the mailman to look into the windows 
while at the house delivering mail and report his 
observations; or the cable TV provider to report 
the viewing habits and preferences of the 
subscriber. Such unauthorized state surveillance 
of its citizens is offensive to the basic tenets of 
our society and would render the protection of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over one’s 
home, illusory. [paras. 24-25]
The accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy was 
violated by the warrantless search conducted by the 
utility at the behest of the police and, absent exigent 
circumstances, was a presumptively unreasonable 
warrantless search which could not be justified. The 
accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction was 
quashed, and a new trial was ordered.  
A Second Opinion
Justice O’Brien disagreed with the majority 
judgment and concluded the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the DRA 
information which outweighs the state’s interest in 
enforcing  drug  laws. In his view, a customer does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
electrical data relative to his or her residential usage. 
Further, the investigative technique employed by the 
police was external to the residence and involved 
obtaining  information concerning  electrical usage 
and patterns of use, which then gave rise to an 
inference of a grow operation within the residence. 
Additionally, the regulatory regime in Alberta 
concerning  the usage of electricity negated any 
confidentiality on the part of a customer vis à vis the 
police, relative to his or her usage thereof. A 
customer could not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy relative to electrical use consumption, when 
the Regulation expressly provided that any such 
information may be provided to the police. 
And even if this was a Charter “search” it was not 
unreasonable. The use of the DRA was authorized by 
law—statute and common law. The search was 
authorized by legislation—the Regulation allowed 
disclosure of customer information for the purpose 
of investigating  an offence.  And the search was also 
authorized by the common law. In this case, the 
police did not request the installation of the DRA 
because of a “hunch” or “intuition”. Rather, the 
police had gathered objectively discernible facts to 
support a reasonable suspicion to believe that a 
marihuana grow operation would be discovered at 
the residence. Justice O’Brien would have dismissed 
the accused’s appeal. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Tainted Search Warrants
“Warrants based solely on tainted 
information are invalid. However, 
where … the warrant was procured on 
the strength of both tainted and 
properly obtained information, the court must 
determine whether it would have issued without the 
improperly obtained information. If the warrant would 
have issued without the tainted information, it remains 
valid, although a s.24(2) analysis could still be necessary if 
a sufficient temporal connection exists between the 
Charter breach and the evidence gathered following that 
breach.” - Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Martin in R. v. 
Gomboc, 2009 ABCA 276 at para. 28, references omitted.
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Manitoba Court of Appeal
JUDGES FACTUAL ERRORS WERE PALPABLE 
BUT NOT OVERRIDING
After receiving  reliable information 
from an informant, the police tailed a 
multi-kilogram cocaine dealer and 
saw what they believed was a drug 
transaction with the accused. The two had met at a gas 
station and left in separate vehicles. The accused was 
stopped and arrested, along with his passenger. Police 
searched the accused’s truck and found six ounces of 
cocaine. The judge found the police had the necessary 
grounds for arrest and the search was lawfully 
conducted incident to that arrest. A conviction of 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
followed. 
On appeal, Manitoba’s top court upheld the 
conviction. A trial judge’s factual findings of fact are to 
be considered by an appeal court on the standard of 
“palpable and overriding  error” while the application 
of the proper test or legal principles to the findings of 
fact are reviewed on a “standard of correctness”. Here 
the trial judge applied the correct legal test - whether 
the officer subjectively had reasonable grounds for 
arrest and whether the grounds for the belief existed 
objectively. On the other hand, the trial judge did make 
some factual errors that were palpable. But they were 
not overriding. Neither of the factual errors were 
signifiant enough to detract from the objectively 
reasonable grounds resulting from the source 
information and surveillance. R. v. McKay, 2009 MBCA 
121
Alberta Court of Appeal
STRIP SEARCH DID NOT WARRANT STAY ON 
MISCHIEF CHARGES
Police officers attended a hospital 
to mediate a situation where an 
intoxicated 17-year-old youth was 
causing  problems at a hospital. 
She went into a bathroom, lit a piece of paper on fire, 
and held it up to the sprinkler system, triggering it and 
causing  $229,000 damage to the health center. The 
accused was arrested by police, but resisted. She 
kicked out the window of a police car. During  a strip 
search at the police station she threw her clothes at 
police, fought, screamed and resisted. She also 
punched an officer in the face. She was charged with 
two counts of mischief (health center and police car 
window) and one count of assaulting police. 
The trial judge found all charges were proven but 
entered a stay on the assault charge. He concluded the 
strip search was a routine one that could not be 
justified. Even though the officer testified he was 
searching  for matches or a lighter, or possible weapons, 
the judge ruled there were not reasonable grounds for 
the strip search and found a s.8 Charter breach. The 
accused then argued before Alberta’s highest court that 
the mischief charges should have also been stayed. But 
the Appeal Court disagreed. A stay of proceedings is an 
extraordinary remedy that should be reserved for 
extreme cases. “While the police should be held 
accountable for their conduct, it does not follow that 
the [accused] should be unaccountable for hers,” said 
the Court. R. v. L.L.S., 2009 ABCA 172
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
CRIMINAL LAW APPLIES TO FIRST NATION 
RESERVES
Police executed a search warrant 
on First Nation’s land and found 
5,974 marihuana plants in various 
stages of development. The grow 
operation was sophisticated and suggested a yield of 
more than 1,100 pounds of marihuana with a 
production value as high as $7.5M. Three men were 
found guilty but appealed their convictions on several 
grounds to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal including 
the jurisdiction of a trial court over native people, the 
lack of intent to commit a crime, and issues relating to 
the search warrant. 
Saskatchewan’s high court rejected all of the accuseds’ 
submissions. “The criminal law applies to First Nations 
Jurisprudence Jolt
IN BRIEF: This section provides a peek of what’s happening in appeal courts across the country.
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people whether on reserve of not,” said Justice Richards 
for the unanimous court. The suggestion that the men 
did not intend to break the law but only planned to 
produce “medicine” and industrial hemp was also 
dismissed. The question was not whether they intended 
to break the law but whether they intended to produce 
and possess marihuana in contravention of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). “The 
validity of a conviction is not contingent on proof that 
an offender specifically set out on a course of action 
which he knew to be a violation of the criminal law.” 
Nor did the search warrant require authorization by a 
Queen’s Bench judge before entry onto an Indian 
Reserve. Section 11 of the CDSA empowers a “justice”, 
which includes a justice of a peace or a provincial 
court judge, to issue a search warrant . R. v. Agecoutay 
et al, 2009 SKCA 100
Ontario Court of Appeal
ENOUGH FOR ACUSED TO BELIEVE HE IS 
CHATTING WITH PERSON UNDER 14
The accused entered a chat room 
and struck up a conversation with 
a police detective posing  as a 
young  13-year old girl. Sexually 
explicit conversation ensued and the accused sent a 
video of himself masturbating to ejaculation. At trial 
the accused said he believed that the person to whom 
he was communicating was at least 18  years old. The 
judge did not believe the accused’s evidence and 
found there was no reasonable effort to determine the 
age of the person he was dealing with. The accused 
was convicted of luring  a child under s.172.1(1)(c) of 
the Criminal Code. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s 
conviction. Section 172.1(1)(c) can apply to 
communications with a person who is not, in fact, 
under the age of 14. It is enough that the accused 
believed he was exposing himself to someone under 
14. This interpretation accords with the nature of the 
offences created by and purpose of s.172.1, and the 
interpretation of the language of s.172.1(1)(c). 
Furthermore, s.173(2) (exposure) applies to images sent 
over the internet. The phrase “in any place” found in s. 
173(2) does not require an accused expose themselves 
in the same physical location as the victim of the 
exposure. There is nothing in the language of s.173(2) 
that suggests the perpetrator and the victim must be in 
the same place. “The phrase ‘in any place’ speaks to 
the location where the perpetrator exposes himself,” 
said Justice Doherty, writing the Court’s opinion. 
“Section 173(2) does not speak to the location of the 
victim when the crime occurs much less require the 
victim be in the same place as the perpetrator.” R. v. 
Alicandro, 2009 ONCA 133
Ontario Court of Appeal
ACTIONS OF DRIVER HAD MORE THAN ONE 
REASONABLE EXPLANATION
The accused was charged after she 
was involved in a single vehicle 
accident in which her passenger 
w a s k i l l e d . S h e a d m i t t e d 
consuming alcohol and an officer smelled alcohol on 
her breath, her speech was slurred and she went limp, 
among other observations. The trial judge concluded 
that the the only reasonable explanation for the 
accused going limp was medical and not indicia of 
impairment. Because of this, the breathalyzer demand 
was invalid, the accused’s s.8  Charter rights breached, 
and the accused was ultimately acquitted of all 
charges.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, set aside the 
acquittals. The trial judge erred in her objective portion 
of her s.8  analysis. The evidence demonstrated that 
there was another reasonable explanation for the 
accused going limp - her consumption of alcohol. This 
explanation, along with the other observations 
CASE QUOTE
“The [accused’s] interpretation of s. 172.1(1)(c) would 
significantly undermine the object of that statutory 
provision in a second way. If the [accused’s] 
interpretation is accepted, communications between an 
accused and a police officer who an accused believes to be 
a young person could not result in a conviction under s. 
172.1(1)(c).   A review of the case law demonstrates that 
police officers posing as young persons is almost the 
exclusive manner in which this provision is enforced.  
This is hardly surprising. Children cannot be expected 
to police the Internet.   The state is charged with the 
responsibility of protecting its children. That 
responsibility requires not only that the appropriate laws 
be passed,  but that those laws be enforced.   The 
[accused’s] interpretation would render the section close 
to a dead letter.” R. v. Alicandro at para. 38.
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provided an objective basis for the demand. But since 
the trial judge did not determine whether the officer 
had the subjective belief needed to make the 
breathalyzer demand, a new trial was ordered. - R. v. 
Duris, 2009 ONCA 740
Ontario Court of Appeal
SINGLE ACT OF INSUBORDINATION WOULD 
NOT AFFECT OFFICER’S CREDIBILITY
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
ruled that a single finding of 
insubordination would not have 
affected a trial judge’s assessment 
of an officer’s credibility. The officer had previously 
refused to give a statement to officers investigating 
other drug cases. The previous act of insubordination 
would not have tainted the trial judge’s finding that it 
was the accused who was driving  a van dangerously. 
The dangerous driving  conviction was upheld. - R. v. 
Scrivanich, 2009 ONCA 721 
Ontario Court of Appeal
NO AUTHORITY FOR REVIEWING JUDGE TO 
EXCLUDE CORRECT INFORMATION 
During  a murder investigation 
police received a good deal of 
information suggesting  that the 
accused and another man were 
responsible for the murder. A homicide detective 
applied for and was granted a wiretap authorization to 
intercept private communications. The trial judge found 
the detective’s preparation of the affidavit was a 
reckless disregard for the truth and the role of the 
authorizing judge. He then chose to excise all 
information - not just erroneous information - relative 
to motive and opportunity from the affidavit and found 
there was not enough information remaining upon 
which to issue the intercept. Under s.24(2) the 
evidence of the intercept was excluded. The Crown 
called no evidence and the accused was acquitted.  
A Crown challenge to the trial court’s ruling  before the 
Ontario Court of Appeal was successful. In reviewing a 
judicial authorization, the reviewing court is to 
determine whether the authorization could have been 
issued. It is not the role of the reviewing judge to 
determine whether they would have issued the 
authorization. In other words, they are not to substitute 
their view for the issuing judge’s. “Nor is the review to 
take on the markings of a trial, where the truth of the 
allegations is explored,” said Justice MacPherson for 
the Court. Instead, the review is simply an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the admissibility of relevant 
evidence about the offence obtained under a 
presumptively valid court order. And although the 
reviewing judge must exclude erroneous information 
from an affidavit supporting a wiretap authorization, 
there is no authority for a reviewing  judge to exclude 
correct information. “The proper approach is for the 
reviewing judge, after excluding the erroneous 
information, to assess the affidavit as a whole to see 
whether there remains a basis for the authorization in 
the totality of the circumstances.” In this case the trial 
judge erred by not conducting the review of the 
wiretap authorization in this way. R. v. Ebanks, 2009 
ONCA 851
Ontario Court of Appeal
SUSPECT AWARE OF JEOPARDY: NO NEED TO 
RE-ADVISE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A woman was found dead in a 
ditch along a rural side road and 
her horse was found running loose 
nearby. Police initially concluded 
she died as a result of a riding accident. Her husband 
was not a suspect at the time. Fifteen years later police 
reopened the case, being skeptical about the accident 
theory. Police persuaded the husband to voluntarily 
attend the police station to take a polygraph test and he 
ultimately confessed to the killing. He was found guilty 
of second degree murder and sentenced to life in 
prison. 
The accused argued on appeal that he was detained 
and his jeopardy significantly changed during the 
CASE QUOTE
“[T]he test on a review of a wiretap authorization is not 
whether there were reasonable grounds to lay charges 
against the individual but rather whether there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that interception of his 
communications may assist in the investigation of the 
offence....It was not necessary for the trial judge in effect 
to conduct a trial as to whether the reliability of the 
anonymous tipsters, the reliability and veracity of what 
the witnesses told the police, and the other evidence 
could be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” R. v. 
Ebanks at para. 33
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polygraph interview - when he admitted to hitting  his 
wife when she got off her horse - and therefore should 
have been re-advised of his right to counsel. The 
Ontario Court of appeal disagreed. The accused was 
aware he was a suspect in the homicide and had been 
made aware that he could access legal advice during 
the polygraph examination consent form procedure. 
There was a sufficient factual connection between the 
s.10(b) caution given to the accused and his detention. 
“The [accused] was told and understood at all times 
that he was being questioned as a suspect and that his 
jeopardy was with respect to an offence of homicide – 
he was asked repeatedly whether he had done anything 
to cause his wife’s death,” said Justice Blair for the 
Appeal Court. “Thus, his status was as a murder 
suspect, and the nature of his jeopardy did not change 
after his first admission.” As well, he had been properly 
advised of his Charter right to counsel and to remain 
silent at the outset of the interview and reminded of his 
s.10(b) rights more than once thereafter.   The evidence 
was clear that he understood both the full 
informational component of his right to counsel, and 
how to implement that right, at all times and could 
have exercised that right at any time during the 
interview, but chose not to do so. - R.v Chalmers, 2009 
ONCA 268
Ontario Court of Appeal
ABSENCE OF GROUNDS IMMATERIAL TO 
APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY
Absent a Charter application, 
where an accused has provided 
breath samples pursuant to a 
demand made under s.254(3) of 
the Criminal Code and the peace officer did not have 
reasonable grounds for making  it, the Crown is 
nonetheless entitled to avail itself of the presumption of 
identity in s.258(1)(c). In two cases before the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, trial judges had rendered convictions 
of driving over 80mg% when certificates of analysis 
were admitted even though the officers making the 
breathalyzer demand lacked the reasonable grounds 
necessary to do so. The Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, however, overturned these convictions. It found 
that the Crown was not entitled to rely on the 
presumption of identity where it failed to prove the 
existence of reasonable grounds to make the breath 
demand. The reference to “demand” under s.258(1)(c) 
means a valid demand-one made by a peace officer on 
reasonable grounds. The appeal judgments ordered 
new trials. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, reinstated the 
convictions. When a peace officer makes a demand 
under s.254(3) and the demand is acceded to (a sample 
is provided) the existence of reasonable grounds for 
making  the demand is irrelevant for the purposes of s.
258(1)(c) and does not affect the admissibility of the 
certificate. Thus, the Crown need not prove that the 
officer had reasonable grounds for making  a breath 
demand in order to rely on the presumption of identity 
found in s.258(1)(c). The Crown's appeal was allowed 
and the convictions were restored. It should be noted, 
however, that accused persons can challenge the 
admissibility of the test results under s.8  of the Charter 
and seek to have those results excluded under s.24(2). 
As well, the absence of reasonable grounds for belief of 
impairment may afford a defence to the charge of 
refusal to provide a breath sample. - R. v. Charette, 
2009 ONCA 310
Ontario Court of Appeal
CONDUCT CREATED RISK OF DANGER: CARE 
OR CONTROL PROVEN
The accused drove her car into a 
deep, steep ditch and it could not 
be driven back up to the road. A 
police officer attended and found 
the accused standing by the driver’s door. The car was 
not running and the keys were not in the car. The car 
was not damaged and could have been driven once 
pulled from the ditch. The accused was looking  for her 
cell phone to arrange for a tow truck. The accused 
failed a roadside test and was arrested for over 80mg%; 
she subsequently provided two breath tests over the 
legal limit. At trial the judge found the accused was in 
care or control and she was convicted. In the judge’s 
view the accused retained care or control of the 
vehicle and there was a risk she would continue her 
CASE QUOTE
“The presumption embodied in s. 258(1)(c) is commonly 
referred to as the presumption of identity.   If applicable, 
the presumption of identity relieves the Crown from 
having to prove that the accused’s blood alcohol level at 
the time of the offence was the same as at the time of 
testing. In those cases where the presumption of identity 
is not available,  the accused’s blood alcohol level at the 
time of the offence must be proven in the ordinary way. 
Normally,  this will require expert testimony from a 
toxicologist.” - R. v. Charette at para. 4. 
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interrupted journey home once the vehicle was pulled 
from the ditch. On appeal to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice the accused’s conviction was 
overturned. In the appeal judge’s opinion the correct 
test was whether the accused engaged in conduct that 
created a risk of danger, not whether there was a risk 
that the accused would engage in conduct that would 
create danger or a risk of danger. 
On appeal by Crown, the accused’s conviction and 
sentence imposed at trial was restored. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal found the trial judge had assessed 
whether the accused’s conduct in relation to the motor 
vehicle was such that it created a risk of danger. The 
Court of Appeal held that the trial judge concluded that 
“there was a risk that upon her vehicle being pulled 
from the ditch, the [accused] would continue her 
interrupted journey home, thereby causing the risk of 
danger that s.253(b) of the Criminal Code is designed 
to prevent.” - R. v. Banks, 2009 ONCA 482
Ontario Court of Appeal
OFFICER REMOVED ANY MEANINGFUL CHOICE 
TO CONSENT BY THREATENING USE OF K9
At about 1:30 am the 19-year-old 
accused was stopped for running a 
red light. He was with two friends 
and produced his driver’s licence, 
registration, and military identity card. He was fidgety, 
nervous and flustered, and the officer became 
suspicious. The accused was asked to step from the 
vehicle. When asked by the officer if the vehicle could 
be searched the accused said “no problem.” When 
asked if the trunk could be searched the accused said 
“do you have a warrant” to which the officer asked “do 
I need a warrant.”  The accused then read a consent to 
search form - which included a warning  about the right 
to counsel - but refused to sign it. The officer 
threatened to have a canine unit attend and sniff out 
any drugs or weapons. The accused capitulated and 
opened the trunk. In the 
trunk was a locked metal 
box which the accused 
was told to open. In it was 
a loaded .22 cal ibre 
handgun - a prohibited 
firearm. At trial the accused was convicted for 
possessing a loaded prohibited firearm under s.95(1) of 
the Criminal Code. Even assuming  the accused was 
arbitrarily detained, the trial judge found the accused 
had freely consented to the search of his trunk, thereby 
waiving  his right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure under s.8  of the Charter. The firearm and 
ammunition was therefore not the product of any 
Charter breach.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge 
erred in finding the search lawful and not a breach of s.
8  of the Charter. The accused did not freely consent to 
the search of his trunk and waive his s.8  Charter rights. 
First, the accused was not fully aware of his rights. Even 
though he read the consent to search form he was 
confused by some of the language in it; he was not 
fully apprised of his rights and did not have all of the 
information required to prove a valid waiver. Second, 
the circumstances supported the accused’s contention 
that he was not going to let the police search his trunk 
without a warrant but ultimately gave up because he 
felt he had no other choice. Also, the accused’s consent 
was not fully informed because the officer misled him 
to believe that if he did not consent to the search of his 
trunk he could be lawfully detained pending  the arrival 
of the canine unit. The officer had no lawful authority 
to hold the accused beyond the time required to 
finalize the traffic ticket. The officer said he had no 
cause to search the trunk and no basis for obtaining a 
warrant to do so; he was acting on a “gut instinct” and 
had no reasonable basis for suspecting the accused had 
a gun of other contraband in his possession. The 
message the officer was sending was “You can refuse to 
consent but it will do you no good because I will bring 
in the canine unit regardless.” This removed any 
meaningful choice the accused had available to him. 
The search amounted to a violation under s.8  of the 
Charter, the accused’s conviction was set aside, and a 
new trial was ordered. - R. v. Bergauer-Free, 2009 
ONCA 610
Ontario Court of Appeal
GROUNDS FOR INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
BASED ON MORE THAN CONCLUSORY 
STATEMENT
Ontario’s top court has dismissed 
an appeal by an accused who 
argued his rights under ss. 8 and 9 
of the Charter were violated by 
police when he was detained. The officer’s reasonable 
grounds for an investigative detention did not rest upon 
purely “conclusory” statements attributed to a 
confidential source.  Rather, the officer who received 
the confidential information explained why he 
considered the source and the information to be 
capitulate |kəˈpi ch əˌlāt| - 
cease to resist an opponent 
or an unwelcome demand; 
surrender. 
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reliable and that it was corroborated by other 
independent knowledge which he outlined.  Moreover, 
the confidential information was supported by the 
surveillance observation made prior to the stop. - R. v. 
O’Hara, 2008 ONCA 819 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
OFF THE RECORD STATEMENT AT SUSPECT’S 
REQUEST OK 
After being arrested for several 
offences, including  extortion, 
un l aw fu l con f i nemen t , and 
abduction, the accused was 
advised of his right to counsel, that he was not obliged 
to say anything, and that anything he said could be 
used as evidence. He spoke to a lawyer and was then 
taken into an interview room. He was told by police 
that the room was video and audio taped. After a short 
conversation, the accused said he would not talk on 
the record - which meant he was “not gonna talk on 
video or nothing”. He was then taken to the front 
atrium area of the police detachment where he spoke 
to police for 10 to 15 minutes. The conversation was 
not electronically recorded and the officer made no 
notes as he was speaking  with the accused. When he 
was returned to the cell the accused said he would 
deny speaking to the officer if he was called to testify. 
Shortly thereafter the officer dictated his recollection of 
the conversation and made notes and ultimately 
prepared a typed report. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the judge 
found the accused’s off-the-record statement was not 
obtained by trickery and thereby did not violate his 
right to silence, was not induced, and was voluntary 
beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, a majority of 
British Columbia’s high court upheld the trial judge’s 
ruling on the voir dire. First, the accused was 
sophisticated in dealing  with the police and had agreed 
to speak off the record to influence the investigation 
while at the same time maintaining deniability. The 
accused defined the off-the-record statement as one not 
electronically recorded; there was no impression that it 
could not be used against him. Second, the 
contemporaneous recording of a police interview with 
a suspect is not a requirement of the common law 
confessions rule, although it is highly desirable and is a 
practice that is encouraged by courts and commissions 
of inquiry. And finally, there was no deliberate conduct 
by the officer that warranted a special instruction by 
the judge concerning the dangers of relying  on an 
unrecorded statement.  Where it was open to the police 
to record an interview but they choose deliberately not 
to do so, then it is important for the jury to be 
instructed that this is an important factor in deciding 
whether to accept the testimony of the police regarding 
the statement. But here, it was the accused who did not 
want to be recorded and the officer simply acceded to 
this request. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. In a 
dissenting  opinion, Justice Mackenzie opined that the 
off the record agreement was an inducement that made 
the accused’s unrecorded statements inadmissible as 
having  been obtained by hope of advantage under the 
confessions rule. - R. v. Narwal, 2009 BCCA 410
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
SOURCE INFORMATION COMPELLING, 
CREDIBLE, & CORROBORATED: WARRANT 
UPHELD
After receiving information from 
confidential informants that the 
accused was transporting cocaine 
from Alberta, the police surveilled 
his vehicle as it was traveling through New Brunswick 
toward PEI. Once he deviated from the normal route 
leading  to PEI the police stopped his vehicle and 
arrested him. The accused’s vehicle was towed to the 
police detachment. A search warrant was obtained and 
the search of the vehicle revealed cocaine. The trial 
judge upheld the warrant. Although he excised some 
information from the ITO, he found the remaining 
source information compelling, the sources were 
previously found to be credible, and police confirmed 
some of the information, in part, through independent 
police investigation. The trial judge was satisfied that 
the issuing  judge had sufficient information before him, 
even without the excised portion, that he could have 
granted the warrant. The accused then appealed, 
contending the trial judge applied the wrong test in 
determining  the validity of the warrant. In his view, the 
trial judge should not have asked himself whether the 
issuing judge had sufficient information such that he 
‘could’ have granted the warrant, but rather whether 
the issuing judge ‘would’ have issued the warrant.
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal disagreed. Even 
without the excised paragraph there remained ample 
information in the ITO to support the warrant. In 
deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish grounds for a search warrant, a judge must 
consider the totality of the circumstances. Here, the 
information from one of the sources alone was 
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sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated that 
on the totality of the circumstances there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that cocaine would be 
found in the accused's car. Even after removing the 
excised paragraph and the information from a second 
source, there nevertheless remained sufficient reliable 
information to support the warrant. - R. v. Arsenault, 
2009 NBCA 29
Ontario Court of Appeal
FAILING TO CONSIDER RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
FATAL TO TRIAL JUDGMENT  
The police executed a Feeney 
warrant and arrested the accused 
at his home. The arrest warrant 
was for trafficking  in a controlled 
substance and possession of proceeds of crime. The 
investigation was part of a large scale operation to 
arrest members of an alleged street gang. Three people 
answered the door, including the accused, and said no 
one else was in the home. At trial police said they 
could hear footsteps coming from the upper levels of 
the residence, heard voices, and smelled marihuana. 
Incident to the arrest the police said they searched the 
residence for safety reasons and found a large quantity 
of cocaine on a bedroom floor. Police obtained a 
search warrant and ultimately seized 109 grms. of 
crack, 249 grms. of powder cocaine and cash. A 
witness for the accused testified there were no sounds 
of footsteps and that police came into the residence 
and immediately ran upstairs. The Crown took the 
position that exigent circumstances precipitated the 
warrantless search while the accused submitted that 
there were no exigencies and that the safety search was 
a manufactured pretence in the course of a shakedown. 
The trial judge found that the Crown had not 
established the reasonableness of the safety search 
conducted as an incident to arrest; therefore it was 
unreasonable and a breach of s.8  of the Charter. In the 
judge’s view the evidence of the police officers was 
contradictory, leaving an irreconcilable conflict in the 
police evidence. The lead investigator said he 
emphasized certain safety concerns to the arresting 
officers at a pre-arrest briefing  that the accused was 
known to cary a gun. One of the arresting officers 
testified he was unaware of that fact. The evidence was 
excluded. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, ordered a new 
trial. The trial judge failed to consider relevant 
evidence. “The officers at the scene of the arrest gave 
evidence of their observations at the scene that 
precipitated a quick ‘safety’ search of the upstairs,” said 
the Court. “That evidence, if accepted, justified the 
search. The conflict with the evidence of the lead 
officer ... was at best neutral and arguably supportive of 
the credibility of the arresting officers’ evidence 
concerning the reason for their search.  The trial judge’s 
failure to consider this body of evidence constitutes 
reversible error.” However, there was evidence from 
the accused’s witness that the search was unjustified 
and in breach of s.8. Thus the order of a new trial. - R. 
v. Okash, 2009 ONCA 37
Ontario Court of Appeal
VEHICLE STOP NOT A PRETEXT TO COVER FOR 
OTHER GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
Undercover police officers became 
suspicious of a vehicle when they 
observed it parked “out of place” 
in a neighbourhood known for 
drugs and crime. The car appeared to be occupied only 
by a female driver. After observing the vehicle for about 
30 minutes the officers saw the accused get into the 
passenger side of the car. The car left the area with the 
police following directly behind it.  A short while later, 
the officers noticed a small child “bouncing  up and 
down” in the backseat, apparently not in a child car 
seat, and they stopped the vehicle. The accused did not 
acknowledge or respond to police, but kept staring 
straight ahead, breathing very heavily. The officer could 
not see the accused’s right hand and he did not 
respond to a question about it. The officer opened the 
passenger door so he could see the accused’s hand and 
saw an obvious bulge in the accused’s pants. The 
accused’s right hand was touching  his pocket area and 
cupped over something. Concerned about the safety of 
the child, the driver and his partner, the accused was 
asked to get out of the car. After emerging from the 
vehicle, the accused attempted to move his hip area 
away from the officer and kept touching his pocket 
area, in spite of the officer’s request that he not do so.  
The officer then took the accused to the police car and 
conducted a pat down search, retrieving  a Smith and 
Wesson .44 calibre handgun. The trial judge found the 
stop was a legitimate use of police powers under 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act and not a ruse or 
gimmick to facilitate a separate criminal investigation. 
The accused was convicted of weapon offences. 
On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal the accused 
argued that although the police had the authority under 
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s.216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act to stop the vehicle 
for a seatbelt violation, they used it as a false 
justification or ruse to engage in an unconstitutional 
stop to allay their suspicions of criminal activity in 
what was a high crime area. He said the trial judge 
erred by misapprehending  the evidence because there 
were alleged discrepancies concerning  the officers’ 
ability to observe whether the child was bouncing  up 
and down out of the car seat due to the car’s window 
tint. But the Court of Appeal disagreed. Neither police 
officer testified the tinted windows were an 
impediment to their ability to see inside the car when 
they were following it. “There was ample basis in the 
record to support the trial judge’s finding  that the 
incident relating to the child seat belt infraction was 
not fabricated, that the stop was justified under the 
Highway Traffic Act, and that the stop for that purpose 
was not simply a pretext or ruse to cover for some 
other general criminal investigation,” said the Court. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. - R. v. Johnson, 
2009 ONCA 668
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
IN TOTAL, INDEPENDENT POLICE 
CORROBORATION OF INDIVIDUAL 
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES NOT REQUIRED
A full time plumber - who was an 
auxiliary (special) RCMP constable 
in his free time - attended the 
accused’s home to install a 
dishwasher. In preparing  for the plumbing work, the 
plumber shifted a large garbage bag  that was open at 
the top and saw small, clear plastic bags containing 
marihuana. The plumber reported these observations to 
a regular RCMP member and prepared an information 
to obtain a search warrant, identifying the plumber 
only as informant “A”. Further inquiries revealed 
secondary information from two other sources 
suggesting drugs would be found on the accused’s 
premises. A search warrant was obtained and police 
found 1.5 kgs. of packaged marihuana, magic 
mushrooms, cannabis resin, and $40,000 in small bills 
as well as scales and other drug paraphernalia. During 
a voir dire the accused argued that the police failed to 
make full and frank disclosure of the plumbers status as 
a special constable and that he was acting as a peace 
officer and state agent when he observed the 
marihuana and reported it to police. As a result, he 
submitted that the information provided by the 
plumber should be excised, the search warrant 
invalidated, and the evidence seized excluded at trial. 
But the trial judge ruled that when the plumber saw the 
marihuana he was acting  as a private citizen, not an 
instrument of the state, and therefore there was no 
reason why he could not be considered a confidential 
informant with informer privilege. The accused was 
convicted on several counts of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld the 
convictions. The plumber’s status as a special constable 
was not a material fact that had to be disclosed. And 
the plumber’s “tip related to direct, first-hand 
observation gained by personal attendance at the 
residence”. Treating the plumber’s tip as confidential 
information, its quality was compelling and was not 
based on gossip, rumour or general bar-room 
discussion. “A single credible informant is capable of 
meeting the required standard” for the issuance of a 
warrant, said Justice Wilkinson for the unanimous 
Appeal Court. Here, however, there were also two 
other informants that offered information. Although 
these sources were of unknown reliability, their 
information corroborated the plumber’s information 
and vice versa. In the totality of the circumstances, 
independent police corroboration of the confidential 
information from the individual sources was not 
required. In this case, sufficient material facts were 
disclosed to meet the legal standard for reasonable 
grounds to issue the search warrant. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. - R. v. McElroy, 2009 SKCA 77
Supreme Court of Canada
VEHICLE STOP NOT A PRETEXT TO COVER FOR 
OTHER GENERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
A majority of the Supreme Court 
of Canada has ruled that a remedy 
under s.24(1) of the Charter can 
include the exclusion of evidence. 
While normally a remedy under s.24(2), exclusion of 
evidence under s.24(1) “will only be available in those 
cases where a less intrusive remedy cannot be 
fashioned to safeguard the fairness of the trial process 
and the integrity of the justice system.” In this case, the 
trial judge ordered the exclusion of late disclosed 
evidence rather than granting a stay of proceedings. 
The accused was acquitted of importing cocaine and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. A majority of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal found the trial judge failed 
to consider whether a less severe remedy could have 
cured the prejudice and set aside the acquittal, 
ordering a new trial. A majority of the Supreme Court 
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of Canada dismissed a further appeal, finding  the judge 
did not impose an appropriate and just remedy when 
an adjournment and disclosure order would have 
sufficiently addressed the prejudice to the accused 
while preserving society’s interest in a fair trial. - R. v. 
Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN FLIGHT TICKETING 
INFORMATION
Members of an “Operation Jetway” 
program designed to curtail drug 
trafficking by monitoring the traveling 
public at airports, were on duty at the 
Halifax International Airport. Drug  couriers were 
known to travel on discount carriers on overnight 
flights. Two police officers attended the Westjet office 
and viewed the passenger manifest of the incoming 
Westjet overnight flight from Vancouver. They were 
looking for passengers traveling alone who had 
purchased a one way ticket with cash shortly before 
departure and checking a single bag. The accused was 
the last passenger listed who fit the indicators. When 
the accused arrived, a sniffer-dog  indicated the 
presence of drugs in his bag and he was arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance when he collected 
his bag  from the luggage carousel. Three kilograms of 
cocaine was found in his bag. The trial judge excluded 
the evidence because he found that the police viewing 
of Westjet’s electronic passenger records that revealed 
the accused’ t icket ing  in format ion was an 
unreasonable search under s.8  of the Charter. The 
accused was acquitted. 
On a Crown appeal the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial. Using  the totality of the 
circumstances test the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the ticketing 
information (the flight number, his name, the walk-up 
cash purchase of a one-way ticket, and the single 
checked bag). “The ticketing  information did not reveal 
intimate details of his lifestyle or personal choices and 
was not specific and meaningful information intended 
to be private and concealed,” said Appeal Court.  There 
was no intrusion into the accused’s home, onto his 
private real property, or into his private personal 
property. And although the information was obtained in 
a private corporate office out of public view, all of the 
accused’s activities that were recorded in the ticketing 
information were conducted in public when he 
purchased the ticket by cash, checked the single bag, 
and boarded the flight in Vancouver. Nor did PIPEDA in 
this case advance the accused’s claim of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Viewing the ticketing 
information and applying a drug courier profile was not 
an unreasonable evidence gathering technique. No 
intimate details were revealed about the accused’s 
lifestyle and personal choices nor was there any direct 
link to such information provided. Thus, without a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the ticketing 
information there was no s.8  breach and the evidence 
was admissible. - R. v. Chehil, 2009 NSCA 111
British Columbia Court of Appeal
PLACING HOLD ON ACCESS TO LAWYER HAD 
NO EFFECT BECAUSE ARRESTEE NOT DILIGENT 
After surveilling three properties, 
the police stopped a moving van in 
which the accused was an 
occupant. The van was driving from 
one house to another and had 316 marihuana plants in 
it, street valued at $40,000. A search warrant was 
executed on the destination house of the van and 
police found 1,139 grms. of drying marihuana and 
evidence of an ongoing, somewhat sophisticated grow 
operation. At trial the accused challenged the grounds 
for his arrest, including the initial stopping  of the van 
which led to his detention and search. As well, he 
argued that the police breached his right to counsel 
under s.10(b) of the Charter because they ordered a 
“hold” on telephone calls to counsel after his arrest and 
he could not use the telephone until several hours later. 
The trial judge found no Charter breaches regarding  the 
accused’s arrest, search, or right to counsel and 
convicted him of drug  charges. But the accused 
appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding  there 
were objective reasonable grounds for his arrest and 
that there was no violation of his right to counsel. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal disagreed. The 
police officer directing the stop and arrest of the 
accused had reasonable grounds to do so. The officer 
CASE QUOTE
“Society demands privacy but also protection from 
crime. A balance must be struck between respecting an 
individual's right to privacy yet recognizing the 
necessity of interfering with that right in the legitimate 
interests of law enforcement.” - R. v. Chehil at para. 
10. 
Volume 10 Issue 1 - January/February 2010
PAGE 56
had information from a combination of sources; B.C. 
Hydro, a source, information relating  the accused to 
other targeted residences and other marihuana grow 
operations, and surveillance of the target residences. 
And even if the details of the information identified by 
the accused was excluded from consideration of 
whether there were objectively reasonable grounds for 
the arrest, the remaining evidence of what the officer 
knew when he ordered the arrest supported it. The 
knowledge and experience of the police officer was 
also relevant in considering  the information available 
to him when assessing  whether there was an 
objectively reasonable belief in the grounds for an 
arrest. The trail judge correctly applied the applicable 
test in determining whether the officer had reasonable 
grounds for arrest. As for ordering a “hold” on calls to 
counsel it had no effect on the accused’s right to 
counsel because he did not exercise it. Had he asked 
to call counsel during the “hold” period and his request 
was refused, that would have been a breach of his s.
10(b) rights. However, he did not diligently pursue his 
right to counsel and therefore could not claim his 
personal rights were violated. The Appeal Court did 
agree, however, that placing a “hold” on calls to 
counsel and delaying the right of an arrestee who 
wanted to speak to a lawyer would be considered a 
very serious breach except in the most rare 
circumstances. - R. v. Budd, 2009 BCCA 595
Quebec Court of Appeal
SUBJECTIVE BELIEF CRITICAL TO REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
Fol lowing  a leng thy pol ice 
investigation involving informants, 
w i r e t a p s , a n d p h y s i c a l 
surveillance, the police set up on 
an apartment they believed was a stash for drugs. The 
accused exited the apartment, got into a vehicle, and 
was stopped by police as he left. The accused was 
arrested and in his coat pocket police found 8.8  grms. 
of cocaine and they recovered a key to the apartment 
and a safe. The apartment was secured, a search 
warrant was sought for it, and, when executed, another 
400 grms. of cocaine was discovered inside a safe. At 
the police station another 8.8  grms. of cocaine fell to 
the ground from the accused's coat. In Quebec District 
Court the accused was convicted of possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  (400 grms. inside the 
apartment) and trafficking in cocaine (approx. 16 grms. 
found on his person). The trial judge concluded that the 
arrest was lawful and the search of the accused was 
incidental to a lawful arrest. He then appealed to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal arguing the police did not 
have reasonable grounds to believe he had drugs on 
him nor inside the apartment at the time of the arrest.
The Quebec Court of Appeal found the arrest unlawful. 
The legal standard for assessing reasonable grounds to 
believe uses both objective and subjective 
requirements. The subjective requirement involves a 
court taking into account what the police subjectively 
believed, not replacing the police reasons for what 
someone else could have considered. Here, the police 
said they arrested the accused solely because they 
believed he committed the crime of drug possession on 
the day of his arrest, not because they believed he had 
committed a criminal act prior to that day. The police 
had no more that suspicion that the accused was in 
possession of drugs. Thus, the only subjective belief in 
evidence was limited to drug possession the day of his 
arrest, which was not objectively reasonable. Thus, the 
detention was arbitrary and the search that followed 
was unreasonable. However, the drugs were 
nonetheless admitted as evidence. Had they 
subjectively believed the accused had, in the months 
preceding, been conspiring  to traffic drugs such belief 
would have been objectively reasonable. If this were 
the case, the arrest would have complied with s.495 of 
the Criminal Code and the search would have been 
reasonable. The Court of Appeal opined that it would 
be surprising if the police did not themselves have such 
subjective grounds, but did not explicitly state them in 
justifying  their intervention, which impacted the 
determination of the violation. As well, drug trafficking 
is a serious crime and the use of the evidence would 
not bring  the administration of justice into disrepute. - 
R. v. Bolduc, 2009 QCCA 1267
CASE QUOTE
“There can be no doubt...that depriving an arrested 
person who has exercised his right to contact counsel of 
that right, where there are no exigent circumstances, is a 
serious violation of s.10(b) of the Charter.” - R. v. Budd 
at para. 32. 
RELATED REMARKS
“An arrest stated for one described offence cannot be 
validated by a later reliance upon another offence for 
which it might have been,  but was not, made.” R. v. 
Huff (1979), 50 C.C.C. (2d) 324 (Alta.C.A.) 
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Ontario Court of Appeal
TATOO TELLS TALE
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
found that a lower court erred in 
excluding an expert’s evidence 
identifying  the potential meanings 
of a teardrop tattoo within the urban street gang 
culture. The accused, who had a teardrop tattoo, had 
been charged with a gang related murder. As part of the 
Crown’s evidence, it sought to call a sociologist to 
provide his opinion as to the meaning of the accused’s 
teardrop tattoo, which had been inscribed on his face 
about four or five months after the murder. In the 
sociologist’s opinion, tattoos are used to communicate 
with fellow gang members and sometimes rival gang 
members. A teardrop tattoo, according  to the expert, 
had one of three possible interpretations within gang 
culture:
• the death of a fellow gang  member or family 
member of the wearer of the tattoo;
• the wearer of the tattoo had served a period of 
incarceration in a correctional facility; or
• the wearer of the tattoo had murdered a rival 
gang member.
The accused’s acquittal was quashed and a new trial 
was ordered. - R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624
Quebec Court of Appeal
POLICE EXCEED SCOPE OF INSTALL BY 
LOOKING FOR HIDDEN COMPARTMENT; GUN 
EXCLUDED
Police obtained a warrant to install 
an electronic listening device into 
the accused’s vehicle so his private 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c o u l d b e 
intercepted. While doing so, they noticed switches on 
the steering  wheel and a smaller than normal cavity 
between the two front seats - it appeared to be a false 
bottom. Although they were not going to place 
equipment in this location they decided to investigate 
further and removed a piece of the console. They 
discovered a secret compartment where they found a 
loaded firearm. They test fired the gun at a laboratory, 
rendered the gun inoperable, and placed it back where 
they found it. Many months later the accused was 
arrested and charged with possession of the prohibited 
firearm. The trial judge found the search to be illegal. 
The search for the compartment was not related to the 
installation of the listening device, nor was it 
connected to a safety concern. However, he found the 
police acted in good faith and the evidence was 
admitted under s.24(2) of the Charter. On appeal, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal tossed the evidence.
In this case, a majority of the Appeal Court concluded 
that the police intentionally and without justification 
opened the console of the car, knowing it was not 
authorized by the warrant. They knew the install 
equipment should not be housed in the area they 
inspected. And there was no urgency. The accused was 
outside the country at the time. As for admissibility, the 
evidence was excluded. The violation was serious. The 
police did not adhere to the limitations of the warrant - 
the install of a listening  device. They did not make a 
mistake nor have an honest belief they were entitled to 
do what they did. The police deliberately decided to 
transform their mission from one of installation to one 
of investigation. Nor did they even have reasonable 
cause to believe the car contained an illegal object. 
The accused’s conviction was quashed and an acquittal 
was entered. The lone dissenting  judge would have 
upheld the admissibility of evidence under s.24(2) and 
dismiss the appeal. - R. v. Beaulieu, 2009 QCCA 797
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Informer Privilege
“Police work, and the criminal 
justice system as a whole, depend to 
some degree on the work of 
confidential informers.  The law 
has therefore long recognized that 
those who choose to act as confidential informers must 
be protected from the possibility of retribution.  The 
law’s protection has been provided in the form of the 
informer privilege rule, which protects from revelation 
in public or in court of the identity of those who give 
information related to criminal matters in 
confidence.  This protection in turn encourages 
cooperation with the criminal justice system for future 
potential informers.” - Supreme Court of Canada Justice 
Bastarache in Named Person v. Vancouver Sun,  2007 SCC 43 at 
para. 16.
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ONUS ON CROWN TO JUSTIFY 
WARRANTLESS SAFETY 
SEARCH PURSUANT TO 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
R. v. MacQuarrie & Yamamoto, 
2009 BCSC 1832
Two uniformed police officers 
received information from a hotel 
security guard that he believed he 
saw a drug  transaction take place 
near the hotel.  He had seen a male 
loitering  in the driveway of the hotel parkade and 
asked him to leave. The male left, but got into a 
silver Honda Civic, which drove a short distance 
away and stopped.  The security guard then saw a 
quick “hand-to-hand” transaction between the male 
and the female driver, after which the male got out 
and the vehicle drove away.  The guard noted the 
licence plate number of the vehicle as “971DRP” 
and described the driver as “Native-looking” with 
long black hair.
The officers found the information matched their 
experience with a dial-a-dope drug  transaction and 
they were also familiar with the hotel being  a past 
location for this type of drug  activity. The officers 
attended the registered owner’s address, which was 
nearby, to investigate the report. They saw a silver 
Honda Civic with no front plate driven by a “Native-
origin-looking  woman” with long  dark hair pull into 
the parkade. The accused MacQuarrie saw the 
police cruiser and appeared 
shocked. The vehicle turned 
into the first available parking 
space and its rear licence plate 
matched the report . The 
officers parked the police car 
behind the vehicle and got out. 
As they approached the vehicle 
a man, the accused Yamamoto, 
arrived in the parkade on foot. 
MacQuarrie was observed 
bending  forward in the seat 
with her hands out of sight. An 
officer instructed her to sit up 
and show her hands because, in his experience, 
people often try to conceal contraband or weapons 
when they have been surprised by the police and the 
under the vehicle seat is a suitable place to hide 
such items or for which to access them. The officer 
advised MacQuarrie why they were there, including 
the observation that had been made of the alleged 
drug  transaction. The officer, concerned about safety, 
shone his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle 
and saw a large amount of money on the floor of the 
driver’s side.  The officer then told MacQuarrie she 
was being  detained for a drug  investigation. Because 
she was still leaning  forward with her hands 
concealed, the officer directed MacQuarrie to exit 
the vehicle.   As she did this she threw a cell phone 
into the back seat and, now with the driver’s door 
open, the officer could also see a large white rock of 
crack cocaine.  MacQuarrie was arrested and 
Chartered. The vehicle was searched incidental to 
arrest and police found $230 on the floor, the cell 
phone, a backpack in the rear of the vehicle with 
$20 bills in an unzipped compartment and another 
$995.
Yamamoto, who had arrived on foot, was constantly 
telling  the officers that they did not have the right to 
search the vehicle, that it belonged to his girlfriend, 
and that the accused was his girlfriend’s friend.  As 
the officer searched the vehicle Yamamoto appeared 
to be trying  to distract the officer by approaching  the 
vehicle and talking  to him.  Police repeatedly told 
Yamamoto to keep back.  Because Yamamoto 
attempted to distract him, his arrival in the parkade 
at the same time as the accused, his statements 
about the ownership of the 
vehicle, and his connection to 
t h e o w n e r, t h e o f f i c e r 
suspected he was connected to 
the offence for which the 
accused had just been arrested.  
Yamamoto was placed under 
investigative detention in 
relation to the drug  offence and 
w a s a s k e d t o p r o d u c e 
ident i f ica t ion. Yamamoto 
turned away from the officer 
and placed his hands into the 
pockets of his jacket.  He was 
“Removing a subject from his or her 
vehicle during an investigative 
detention in the interests of officer 
safety has been viewed as the 
functional equivalent of a 
protective pat-down search… 
Because searches incidental to a 
power of investigative detention 
are obviously warrantless, the onus 
is on the Crown to justify them.”
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asked to remove his hands from his pockets and 
patted down.  As the officer tried to pat down 
Yamamoto’s left jacket pocket, Yamamoto attempted 
to place his hand over that pocket. When the pocket 
was patted down the officer felt marble-sized lumps 
within it, consistent with the larger rock of cocaine 
discovered in the vehicle.  Believing  this was dugs, 
the officer arrested Yamamoto for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking.  During  a search incident to 
that arrest, the officer removed cocaine and heroin 
from Yamamoto’s jacket pocket.  
During  a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme 
Court, the accuseds argued that the requirements for 
a valid investigative detention were not met because 
the facts provided to the officer by the security guard 
and the subsequent observations were insufficient to 
support their detentions. Thus, they contended that 
their rights under ss.8  (search and seizure) and 9 
(arbitrary detention) of the Charter were breached. 
Justice Schultes, however, disagreed. Noting  the 
standard to be satisfied to justify an investigative 
detention requires a reasonable suspicion he stated:
Removing a subject from his or her vehicle 
during  an investigative detention in the interests 
of officer safety has been viewed as the 
functional equivalent of a protective pat-down 
search… Because searches incidental to a power 
of investigative detention are obviously 
warrantless, the onus is on the Crown to justify 
them… 
In this case, I conclude [the officer] did have a 
reasonable suspicion that each accused was 
connected to a particular crime, one that went 
beyond a mere suspicion.   While it is true that 
[the security guard] did not witness the entire 
offence of drug trafficking  from beginning to 
end, including  an original telephone order for 
drugs, he did observe quite a distinctive pattern 
of behaviour that was consistent in all its 
features with the attributes of a dial-a-dope 
transaction.   In addition, [the officer] was 
entitled to take into account the past use of that 
hotel site for similar transactions in forming his 
suspicions.   Having received this information, it 
was prudent for the officers to go to the address 
of the registered owner of the vehicle to see if it 
could be located or the registered owner could 
provide further information.
Ms. MacQuarrie’s arrival at the parkade in the 
same vehicle that had been described as being 
involved in this transaction, the extent to which 
her appearance conformed to the very basic 
description that had been provided of the female 
driver, and her shocked expression upon seeing 
the officers there all added to the reasonableness 
of [the officer’s] suspicion and made it 
appropriate for him to approach the vehicle.  
Once he came to the driver’s window, his 
observation of the cash scattered on the floor, 
which I have found occurred before she exited 
the vehicle, when added to his previous 
observations, provided reasonable grounds to 
suspect that she was engaged in the offence of 
possession for the purposes of trafficking.  The 
officer safety issues raised by the position of her 
hands and the possible availability to her of 
weapons made it reasonable to remove her from 
the vehicle for the purpose of detaining  her. 
[references omitted, paras. 25-27]
Since the investigative detention was lawful, the 
discovery of the rock of cocaine when the vehicle 
door was opened provided proper grounds to arrest 
the accused for the offence of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking  and a search the interior of the 
vehicle incident to that arrest was proper. It was also 
reasonable for the officer to suspect Yamamoto was 
involved in the crime of possessing  drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking:
He had appeared in the parkade as the vehicle 
arrived.  His unsolicited statement to the officers 
linked him both to the owner of the vehicle and 
to Ms. MacQuarrie as its current driver and his 
contact with the officers made it reasonable to 
infer that he wanted to distract [the officer] 
during  his search of the vehicle. I find, therefore, 
that his investigative detention was also lawful.  
The discovery of the drugs in Mr.  Yamamoto’s 
pocket occurred during the kind of pat-down 
search that was contemplated in Mann and, 
once they had been discovered, his arrest was 
certainly justified.
There were no Charter violations and the evidence 
was admissible. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Chief Superintendent Douglas Coates 
(57 years) and Sergeant Mark 
Gallagher (50 years) were killed 
when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake 
struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 
January 12, 2010.
Both officers were among  82 other Canadian police 
officers who were assigned to the RCMP's 
International Peace Operations Branch and had been 
deployed to Haiti to help train local law 
enforcement officers. When the earthquake struck, 
the buildings that Sergeant Gallagher and Chief 
Superintendent Coates were in collapsed, killing 
them.
Chief Superintendent Coates had served with the 
RCMP since 1978  and is survived by his wife and 
three children.
IN MEMORIAM
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canadaChief Superintendent Douglas Coates
Sergeant Mark Gallagher
Sergeant Gallagher had served with the RCMP for 
11 years and had previously served with the 
Moncton, New Brunswick, Police Service for 14 
years. He is survived by his wife and two children.
